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 What is the news media’s role in influencing political engagement, participation, 
and polarization at the state level? This thesis reviews existing literature on the history 
of journalism in the United States, the relationship between media consumption and 
political behavior, and the relationship between media consumption and political 
polarization. Case studies examine three states selected by a formula measuring 
population, length of legislative session, and political diversity in presidential elections. 
The first chapter studies the relationship between the size of statehouse press corps 
and voter participation in Massachusetts, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin, finding no 
significant effect on turnout. The second examines the influence of partisan news on 
political attitudes in the same three states. Findings support existing theories that 
increased availability of partisan news is connected to heightened political engagement, 
along with heightened polarization. The final chapter brings a sharp focus to the state of 
Wisconsin—ranked by several measures as one of the most polarized states in the 
country—assessing a set of factors that have contributed to deepening divisions in an 
effort to better understand media’s role in polarization. Findings indicate that a changing 
media landscape does influence polarization, but its effects are intertwined with other 
factors. Government-based and industry-based solutions are recommended to build 
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The reporter, “as much as anyone, and more than a great many, helps to shape 
the course of government,” wrote Douglass Cater (journalist and, later, aide to President 
Lyndon B. Johnson) in his 1959 analysis of the journalism industry, The Fourth Branch 
of Government.1 Whether journalism in the United States is an industry that operates 
within the confines of corporate interests, an independent venture that casts a watchful 
and critical eye on the government, or a quasi-governmental operation best classified as 
the “fourth estate” or a “fourth pillar of democracy,” it is indeed a cog in the wheel of the 
country’s political system. In fact, some observe, as mass communication and political 
science scholar Timothy E. Cook did, that the “American news media today are not 
merely part of politics; they are part of government.”2 
In spite of this inextricable link between journalism and government, the 
relationship between the two institutions is rarely a cozy one. Although the 
contemporary news media are “much less deferential” to institutions and power than 
they once were, tensions between journalists and elected officials date back to the 
United States’ fledgling days.3 While anti-press attitudes are not new to the nation, trust 
in the news media fell to a record low in 2016, and has not risen above 50 percent since 
2005.4 As media scholar Amanda Darrach put it, “The media’s credibility problem 
certainly didn’t start with Donald Trump. It’s as much a part of the history of the press as 
                                                          
1 Cater, Douglass. The Fourth Branch of Government, 7. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959. 
2 Cook, Timothy E. Governing With the News: The News Media as a Political Institution, 3. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
3 Schudson, Michael. “The Fall, Rise, and Fall of Media Trust.” Columbia Journalism Review, 2019. 
https://www.cjr.org/special_report/the-fall-rise-and-fall-of-media-trust.php.  
4 Brenan, Megan. “Americans Remain Distrustful of Mass Media.” Gallup, November 9, 2020. 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/321116/americans-remain-distrustful-mass-media.aspx.  
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ink and paper.”5  However, there is no question that Donald Trump, as a candidate and 
as president, has thrown gasoline onto the anti-media fire and continued to fan the 
flames at every opportunity—referring to journalists as “the enemy of the people” and 
the “opposition party,” dismissing unflattering coverage as “fake news,” and publicly 
ridiculing individual journalists and news outlets.6  
As of January 2019, 11 percent of Trump’s (frequent) tweets to his tens of 
millions of followers were insults or condemnations of journalists, publications, and the 
news media as a whole.7 It is not uncommon at Trump rallies for the crowd to break into 
a “CNN sucks” chant, or for individuals and groups of supporters to approach the 
penned-in workspace for press shouting insults or taking photos of individual reporters.8 
As a journalist who has covered Trump rallies in several Wisconsin cities, I have 
experienced both.9 In 2016, a man was photographed at a Trump rally wearing a shirt 
advocating the lynching of journalists; the shirt was available for purchase for a brief 
time from Walmart—one of the largest retailers in the world.10 After the June 2018 mass 
shooting at The Capital Gazette, a newspaper in Annapolis, Maryland, the Committee to 
                                                          
5 Schudson. “The Fall, Rise, and Fall of Media Trust.” 
6 Sugars, Stephanie. “From Fake News to Enemy of the People: An Anatomy of Trump's Tweets.” 
Committee to Protect Journalists, January 30, 2019. https://cpj.org/2019/01/trump-twitter-press-fake-
news-enemy-people/. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Wilstein, Matt. “CNN Cuts Away From Trump Rally After 'CNN Sucks' Chant Breaks Out.” The Daily 
Beast, June 19, 2019. https://www.thedailybeast.com/cnn-cuts-away-from-trump-rally-after-cnn-sucks-
chant-breaks-out. 
9 Opoien, Jessie. Twitter post, October 8, 2016, 3:53 p.m. 
https://twitter.com/jessieopie/status/784859406672334848; Opoien. Twitter post, October 8, 2016, 3:57 
p.m., . https://twitter.com/jessieopie/status/784860377720819712; Opoien. Twitter post, October 8, 2016, 
3:57 p.m.. https://twitter.com/jessieopie/status/784860238277074944; Opoien. Twitter post, October 8, 
2016. 3:56 p.m.. https://twitter.com/jessieopie/status/784860015395909632; Opoien. Twitter post, 
October 8, 2016, 2:28 p.m.. https://twitter.com/jessieopie/status/784837956611641344.  
10 Zadrozny, Brandy. “The Man Behind 'Journalist, Rope, Tree'.” The Daily Beast, November 9, 2016. 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-man-behind-journalist-rope-tree; Perrigo, Billy. “Walmart Removes 
'Rope. Tree. Journalist.' Shirt from Store.” Time, December 1, 2017. https://time.com/5044596/rope-tree-
journalist-walmart-shirt-removed-threatening/.  
3 
Protect Journalists and other press freedom advocates urged the president to be more 
careful with his rhetoric; however, five days later he referred to the news media as the 
“opposition party,” and 17 days after that, he reiterated that “much of the news media is 
indeed the enemy of the people.”11 
Up until the November 3, 2020 presidential election, some may have argued 
(particularly the Republican senators who have made a policy of refusing to comment 
on them), unconvincingly, that the president’s tweets do not have the same bearing on 
the function of our government as speeches and other rhetoric.12 But that argument 
went out the window when Donald Trump, with the support of a majority of elected 
Republicans, refused to accept that Democrat Joe Biden had defeated him both in 
popular and Electoral College vote totals. Weeks after The Associated Press and every 
major television news network declared Biden to be president-elect, Trump had still not 
conceded and was instead sowing doubts about the integrity of U.S. elections and the 
U.S. press. On the day the race was called for Biden, Trump tweeted: “Since when does 
the Lamestream Media call who our next president will be?”13 The answer is “since 
1848.”14 In actuality, a call from The Associated Press and other major news networks 
                                                          
11 Sugars. “From Fake News to Enemy of the People”; Capital Gazette Staff. “Capital Gazette Shooting: 
What to Know about Fatal Newsroom Attack and the Man Who Was Found Guilty in It.” Capital Gazette, 
October 28, 2019. https://www.capitalgazette.com/news/crime/ac-cn-capital-gazette-trial-updates-
20191028-kuhqsr55b5al7aenqwangehbsa-story.html. 
12 Kapur, Sahil, Frank Thorp V, and Julie Tsirkin. “'Haven't Read the Damn Thing': Republican Senators 
Dodge Questions about Trump's Conspiracy Tweet.” NBCNews, June 9, 2020. 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/haven-t-read-damn-thing-republican-senators-dodge-
questions-about-n1228591; Cochrane, Emily. “That Trump Tweet? Republicans Prefer Not to See It.” The 
New York Times, June 9, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/09/us/politics/trump-twitter.html;  Azari, 
Julia. “Trump Should Keep Tweeting.” Vox, June 30, 2017. https://www.vox.com/mischiefs-of-
faction/2017/6/30/15900538/trump-tweeting-transparency.  
13 Trump, Donald J. Twitter post, November 8, 2020, 12:52 p.m.. 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1325511603157159942?lang=en.  
14 Olson, Alexandra. “Explainer: Why Do the Media Call Races in US Elections?” AP NEWS. Associated 
Press, November 11, 2020. https://apnews.com/article/why-does-media-call-races-us-elections-
20e9b5688aa0b7404648ea74b1c2f4dc.  
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has been accepted by candidates as a legitimate declaration since the organization 
declared the election of Zachary Taylor as president, even though the declaration is not 
legally binding.15 
A closer look at attitudes toward the news media illustrates the troubling 
phenomenon of growing polarization among Americans. In 2015, the percentage of 
Democrats who expressed either a great deal or a fair amount of trust in mass media 
was 55 percent; for Republicans it was 32 percent—a 23-point gap.16 In the years that 
followed, the division has precipitously widened, as Democrats’ trust continued to grow 
and Republicans’ diminished, to a record 63-point gap between parties in 2020.17 The 
effects of polarization are felt in Congress and in state legislatures across the country, 
leading to more gridlock and less compromise—exacerbating many voters’ feelings that 
elected officials aren’t working for them and, in turn, providing more fuel for mistrust of 
institutions like government and news media.  
This thesis analyzes, at a broad level, the relationship between news media, 
government, and polarization, with a particular focus on state government—a level that 
holds great importance and more immediately observed effects than the federal level—
and identifies opportunities for future research and potential solutions to the growing 
divide. Recommendations are made for solutions based both in government and the 
journalism industry. 
 Despite the general expectation that journalists serve as a conduit between 
citizens and their government, traditional coverage of state governments has been in 
                                                          
15 Ibid. 
16 Brenan. “Americans Remain Divided.” 
17 Ibid. 
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decline since at least the 1980s.18 For example, nearly 1,800 local newspapers have 
folded since 2004, and overall newsroom employment throughout the U.S. has declined 
by 45 percent.19 This reduction raises questions about a number of possible residual 
effects. With fewer reporters employed, resources are stretched and fewer bodies are 
available to cover state government, which can lead to fewer stories being covered or to 
stories being given a shallower treatment than they would receive with more time and 
resources. The dearth of traditional reporters also opens a gap that, in some cases, has 
been filled by less traditional—and sometimes more partisan—blogs, magazines, and 
other sources.20  
 Research that could shed light on what those declines might mean for 
participation in democracy has focused largely on the relationship between media 
coverage and local governments or media coverage and national government, but little 
attention has been paid to how declining statehouse coverage affects civic engagement 
at the local level. Former Governing executive editor Alan Ehrenhalt has advocated for 
bridging the gap between political science and journalism, particularly with a focus on 
state government, with an argument distilled into an aphorism. He said: “A political 
scientist is somebody who knows all the right questions but has trouble getting the 
answers. A reporter is somebody who's great at getting answers but has no idea what 
the questions are.”21  
                                                          
18 Layton, Charles, and Mary Walton. "Missing the Story at the Statehouse." American Journalism 
Review, vol. 20, no. 6, 1998, p. 42. 
19 Abernathy, Penelope Muse. The Expanding News Desert. Report. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2018. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ehrenhalt, Alan. "Political Science and Journalism: Bridging the Gap." Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 1 
(2003): 127-30. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3687819. 
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The first chapter of this thesis assesses the current body of literature, exploring 
the role of journalists, reductions in the industry, and the relationship between 
journalism and political participation. Assessing participation through the lens of voter 
turnout in the first chapter lays the groundwork for more nuanced analyses of voter 
attitudes and polarization in chapters two and three. This chapter offers a historical 
summary of journalism’s shifts between partisan influence and objectivity—with a focus 
on the relationship between journalism and government—an overview of reductions in 
the journalism industry, and an analysis of the role of journalism in civic engagement 
and polarization. 
Through a set of three case studies—Massachusetts, Oklahoma, and 
Wisconsin—I examine trends in statehouse coverage and voter turnout in each state. I 
selected these states by applying a set of criteria that valued similarity in population and 
length of legislative session while allowing for the inclusion of one “red” state, one “blue” 
state, and one “purple” state.22 
This analysis finds no conclusive evidence of a link between voter turnout and 
the number of reporters assigned to cover a state capitol, in part due to insufficient 
available data to form a conclusion about two of the states. Further research would 
benefit from a wider sample of states, especially states with more extensive data on 
press coverage and turnout. Additional measures of participation outside of turnout 
could provide more enlightening information. 
The second chapter explores the relationship between partisan and ideological 
news media and political engagement of its consumers. Since the late 1980s, the 
                                                          
22 See p. 23 for more explanation on how I selected these three states. 
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United States has seen a surge in the availability and consumption of partisan and 
ideological news coverage.23 While this shift toward partisan news is relatively new to 
contemporary media, it is not a first for this country. In particular, the second section 
explores whether the presence of partisan and ideological media influences people’s 
participation in the political process today when compared to periods of more objective 
reporting, and how polarization factors into engagement and political behavior. 
This chapter offers a historical overview of the origins of partisan press in the 
United States, the shift toward objectivity, the emergence of new partisan media, and 
information about people’s news consumption preferences. A review of existing 
literature finds that partisan media encourages the most extreme partisan voices to 
participate in the political process, potentially at the expense of more moderate voices—
and that, while polarized voters are more likely to participate in politics, they are also 
less likely to consider competing perspectives. I note that factors involved in this area of 
study are rapidly changing, and we are only just beginning to amass a body of research 
that identifies the most recent effects. 
For the sake of consistency, this chapter uses case studies in the same three 
states as the first chapter. The three states’ trends are also presented in the context of 
similar measures at the national level. In each state, I provide an overview of the 
presence of partisan news media, turnout in midterm and presidential elections, and 
survey data on attitudes toward news media and government. Data included in this 
chapter show that Democrats and Republicans are polarized in their views toward news 
media, with Republicans far more likely to hold negative attitudes. 
                                                          
23 Cook. Governing With the News. 
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At the end of the second chapter, I revisit the premise that the prevalence of 
partisan media leads to increased political engagement, but also increased polarization, 
and find that my case studies neither confirm nor deny the theory. Once again, 
Wisconsin has far more data points available than Massachusetts and Oklahoma. I find 
there does not appear to be a strong connection between partisan media and election 
turnout. I also reiterate that the overall level of trust and value in traditional news media 
is on a downward trajectory, with the strongest negative perceptions held by 
Republicans—and while both parties favor local news over national publications, local 
newsrooms continue to shrink. 
One of the biggest questions that remains is whether partisan media has driven 
polarization, or has emerged in response to a widening chasm between parties. It would 
also be useful in future research to assess whether voters value objectivity over 
reinforcement, and whether they wish to be exposed to perspectives that differ from 
their own. As before, additional research on this front would benefit from a larger 
sample of states, especially states with more available data. 
The final chapter of this work focuses solely on the state of Wisconsin for several 
reasons: 1) Of the states in my case studies, Wisconsin consistently had the most 
available data; 2) Wisconsin is consistently ranked among the most polarized states in 
the country; 3) Wisconsin is a swing state, with a history of elections being decided by 
less than 1 percentage point; and 3) My experience as a journalist in Wisconsin for the 
last decade, covering the state capitol for most of that time, gives me a unique insight 
into the state’s political and media dynamics.  
9 
While acknowledging other significant events and factors, this chapter assesses 
the role that changes to the state’s media landscape may have played in Wisconsin’s 
ascent to one of the country’s most polarized, least active state governments. 
In this chapter, I note Wisconsin’s historical tradition of electing candidates from 
the far left to the far right, at times even in the same year. That phenomenon appears to 
be reflected in the state legislature, where the ideological gap between the two parties—
which was already wide—has continued to grow over time.  
Drawing from my experience covering state government, I highlight recent 
incidents that demonstrate the extent to which polarization has affected the state 
capitol. As a political journalist in Madison, I have witnessed a growing level of 
dysfunction in Wisconsin’s state government; however, I do not rely solely on my own 
assessment. This chapter features both anecdotal and quantitative analysis to make 
clear that Wisconsin’s legislative polarization has led to serious inaction—particularly in 
the case of government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. It also examines 
historical election trends dating back to the early 1990s—a period marked by two 
prominent statewide candidates (one Democrat, one Republican) who earned 
significant support from both parties. 
An intensely debated piece of legislation passed in 2011 was a significant turning 
point for political attitudes and participation in Wisconsin. The passage of “Act 10,” a law 
curtailing collective bargaining rights for most public employees, serves as an important 
point of reference as I examine the factors that have contributed to polarization in 
10 
Wisconsin—which national media referred to as “the most polarized state in the country” 
in 2012.24  
This chapter makes extensive use of polling data to observe trends in 
Wisconsinites’ views about government, views of specific political figures, news media 
consumption, and political communication habits. It also taps into observations from a 
recent effort by University of Wisconsin-Madison researchers to “understand the state of 
politics and communication in Wisconsin over the last decade using ongoing public 
opinion research, computational content analysis of media, and qualitative fieldwork and 
interviews of citizens and elites.” The goal of this research, as stated by Michael W. 
Wagner, is nearly synonymous with the goal of this thesis: 
“We want to understand what we can do to help ease that polarization and 
encourage more productive political processes in the legislature and between 
citizens across lines of political difference. The fracturing in Wisconsin is a 
problem because democracy requires cooperation and compromise across lines 
of political difference.”25 
In my assessment of polarization factors related to news media, I note the 
significant consolidation of media ownership, both in Wisconsin and throughout the 
country, along with the diminished presence of local journalism—and find that media 
ownership both influences content and affects readers’ trust and perception of a 
publication. I also delve into the history and political effects of conservative talk radio in 
                                                          
24 Cillizza, Chris. “Scott Walker and the Most Polarized State in the Country.” The Washington Post, April 
4, 2012. https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/scott-walker-and-the-most-polarized-
electorate-in-the-country/2012/04/04/gIQAaIBnvS_blog.html. 
25 “UW Scholars Receive Major Funding to Study Polarization and Civic Renewal.” News. UW-Madison, 
July 22, 2019. https://news.wisc.edu/uw-scholars-receive-major-funding-to-study-polarization-and-civic-
renewal/. 
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Wisconsin, including reflections from an interview with one of the state’s most influential 
radio hosts who has since left the airwaves.  
 A study of news consumption habits finds that, in recent years, the percentage of 
voters who read a newspaper or watch local TV news every day has decreased, while 
the percentage who say they never do these things has increased. Polling also 
indicates that voters’ conversations about politics are likely more homogeneous than 
not—a noteworthy observation with the knowledge that voters with more diverse 
information diets are more likely to split their tickets. 
 With the recent 2020 presidential election results, I also seek to place this 
research in the context of Wisconsin, which delivered a razor-thin victory to Joe Biden 
only four years after Donald Trump narrowly won the state. This context includes the 
notable observation that only one Republican member of the state legislature had 
publicly acknowledged Biden as president-elect nearly a month after the election was 
called (however, it should be noted that a Republican leader in the state Assembly said 
the caucus would not become involved in efforts to change the selection of the state’s 
electors).26 
                                                          
26 Vetterkind, Riley, and Mitchell Schmidt. “Only One Elected Republican in Wisconsin Has Acknowledged 
Joe Biden Is President-Elect.” Wisconsin State Journal, November 15, 2020. 
https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/only-one-elected-republican-in-wisconsin-has-
acknowledged-joe-biden-is-president-elect/article_b7278198-c417-5408-ac4c-4e0b0e64edfa.html; 
Steineke, Jim. Twitter post, Nov. 29, 1:24 p.m. November 29, 2020. 
https://twitter.com/jimsteineke/status/1333129677641306114; Van Wagtendonk, Anya. “Could 
Lawmakers 'Mess' with Wisconsin's 10 Electoral Votes? Possibly.” Wisconsin State Journal. Wisconsin 






 At some point in the future, researchers should examine in more detail how 
elected officials, journalists, and voters responded to the coronavirus pandemic. A set of 
in-depth interviews with current and former elected officials also would likely prove to be 
enlightening.  
 This work concludes that journalism does have a relationship with polarization, 
but it is difficult to separate any one factor in polarization. Consumption of partisan 
content does, in many cases, bolster engagement; however, it empowers the most 
extreme voices while shutting out more moderate perspectives. As partisan outlets fill 
the gaps where traditional publications disappear, news consumers’ negative attitudes 
toward competing views are reinforced, and lawmakers lose incentives to compromise. 
Policy negotiations become a zero-sum transaction, and little is accomplished—
reinforcing voters’ negative attitudes toward government and institutions in general.  
 Further research should expand this analysis to study the country’s most and 
least polarized states, and their corresponding media landscapes, to determine trends 
in each category. Efforts to restore journalism resources and build trust with audiences 
will involve trial and error, but all such efforts should be implemented with the aim of 
increasing transparency and decreasing polarization. To preserve journalism’s role as 
the “fourth estate,” government-based solutions should be limited in favor of industry-
based efforts; however, several promising regulatory proposals offered by members of 
Congress are worth pursuing.  
 In spite of the discouraging trends of mistrust and discord, an overwhelming 
majority of voters believe journalism is “critical” or “very important” to democracy, and 
that journalists can play a role in healing the country’s political divisions. The opportunity 
13 
offered by those beliefs should not be squandered. Further efforts to understand how 
the news media can gain the trust of the public and how the ideological gap can be 
































Chapter One: Journalism and Political Participation 
The Role of Journalists 
Journalism in the United States began as a partisan venture. It was later driven 
toward a standard of objectivity, spurred by technology and market forces. The most 
recent ideological shift came first with the advent of partisan—and mostly 
conservative—talk radio in the early 1990s, and ideologically-influenced cable television 
programming in the late 1990s. Since then, the country has seen this carried through to 
the internet, its natural extension.27 
Although the presumption of objectivity has governed traditional journalism for 
centuries, the press was born in the United States as a political entity. The country’s first 
newspapers were founded as a means to accomplish partisan goals—more lapdog, or 
perhaps attack dog, than watchdog—and often funded with government subsidies.28 
The newspaper publishers of the 18th century did not seek to present an 
objective truth; they sought to make the best case for their parties, candidates, and 
causes. To that end, newspapers within the same political party supported each other 
through advertisements and shared subscriptions, and often reprinted news from other 
like-minded publications.29 To newspaper editors and publishers of the 18th century, the 
concept of objective and detached journalism was misleading and disingenuous. They 
sought not to present an objective truth, but to make the case for “right” over “wrong.”30 
                                                          
27 Stewart, Donald H. The Opposition Press of the Federalist Period. Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1969; Sheppard, Si. The Partisan Press: a History of Media Bias in the United States. Jefferson, 
NC: McFarland & Company, 2008; Cook. Governing With the News. 
28 Cook. Governing With the News. 
29 Stewart. The Opposition Press of the Federalist Period. 
30 Sheppard. The Partisan Press. 
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In 1870, nearly 90 percent of the country’s daily newspapers were affiliated with 
a major political party. Thirty years later, the partisan affiliation share had been cut in 
half.31 By the end of the 19th century, newspapers no longer operated as an extension 
of political parties and had instead become “enormous enterprises free of political and 
financial sponsorship by government.”32  
Federal patronage of newspapers—a standard that began in the late 1700s and 
reached its apex under Andrew Jackson33—ended in the late 1800s. Around the same 
time, technological advances allowed newspapers to expand their circulation and reach 
a new kind of audience. The press evolved from a political operation to a commercial 
one, supported by advertisers rather than political parties and the federal government.  
As audiences grew, the scope of the subject matter covered by the press 
expanded. So, too, did the resources dedicated to original reporting. With the advent of 
the cheaply produced “penny press” came the practice of newspapers sending their 
own reporters to cover proceedings in Washington, D.C.34 Within the same time frame, 
Congress stopped regulating access to its proceedings, turning over the responsibility to 
reporters. This was a subtle acknowledgment of journalism as an independent industry, 
rather than a function of government.35 The U.S. House Press Gallery, which “assists 
credentialed members of the daily print and online news media and enforces the rules 
for coverage of the U.S. Congress,” and the U.S. Senate Press Gallery, which does the 
same for reporters covering the U.S. Senate, operate “under the stewardship of the 
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Standing Committee of Correspondents, created in 1879.”36 The correspondents who 
serve on this committee are elected by their peers in the Congressional Press 
Galleries.37 
With the Progressive era of the early 1900s came the birth of the muckraking 
journalist—reporters who sought to dig up dirt, exposing wrongs and provoking societal 
change. Although the term “muckraker” was meant by President Theodore Roosevelt as 
an insult, reporters embraced it and continue to apply it to a variety of forms of 
investigative reporting, public journalism and advocacy journalism.38 Since the golden 
age of muckraking, it has taken on new forms—although some have argued the field 
veered away from public service journalism and toward “irresponsible scandal 
coverage” in the late 1990s and 2000s.”39 Even the modern tendency to fixate on juicy 
scandals can trace its roots back to the sensationalist “yellow journalism” promoted by 
William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer as they competed for market domination 
in the late 1800s.40 
The two values that dominate modern journalism are objectivity and autonomy.41 
Journalists placed an increased value on autonomy—that is, interpreting the story rather 
than recycling and restating candidates’ talking points—in the aftermath of the 1988 
presidential election, in particular. This shift was triggered in part by George W. Bush’s 
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race-baiting “Willie Horton” campaign ad, which left many in the media feeling as if their 
objective reporting was held “captive” by the agenda of campaigns and their 
consultants.42 Rather than simply repeating and elevating talking points, many reporters 
started to seek a more analytic approach. It is argued that this shift toward interpretive 
reporting has made reporting more about the theatrics of politics and less about the 
ideas being debated.43 Further, the apex of objective news reporting arrived when 
Walter Cronkite led the anchor desk at CBS News in the 1960s and 1970s.44 
The symbiotic relationship between the press and the political system is no 
longer directly financial, but it is still present as the press is “increasingly incorporated 
into the activities of the constitutional three branches, without becoming a mere 
extension of any one of them.”45 Elected officials disseminate their message and curry 
public favor through media coverage. Media coverage, in turn, can make or break a 
policy proposal. 
Even journalists who strive to report with objectivity should be considered political 
actors.46 In fact, as Cook posited, the media’s “political influence may emerge not in 
spite of, but because of, their principled adherence to norms of objectivity, deference to 
factuality and authority, and a let-the-chips-fall-where-they-may distance from the 
political and social consequences of their coverage.”47 
Not every scholar unflinchingly accepts the “fourth estate” classification for 
journalism. “Journalism, for all its occasional lofty pretensions, sits awkwardly in a 
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discussion about stewards of democracy,” wrote journalism professor Michael 
Schudson, arguing that journalists play the role of “reluctant stewards.”48 Not only do 
journalists sometimes fall short of the democratic ideals ascribed to them; they may also 
fail to understand how to support those ideals. However, there still is a role for 
journalists to play in a healthy democracy, and an ambiguous definition of stewardship 
can be beneficial to the industry by leaving room for experimentation and innovation.49 
Yet another school of thought considers the role of “public journalism” or “civic 
journalism.” Should journalists operate from a detached, view-from-nowhere 
perspective, or should they strive to encourage citizens to participate in the democratic 
process? “Civic journalists” work toward the latter.50 A comparison can be drawn 
between newspapers and educational curriculum—both “designed to facilitate learning 
and development and to impose meaning on experience.”51  
In 2020, the concept of “public journalism”—that is, journalism executed with the 
goal of “encouraging and improving public deliberation”—might not seem radical, but 18 
years ago, political science professor Albert Dzur wrote of its controversial nature.52 
Public journalism differs from traditional journalism by “advocating public listening in 
newsgathering, by producing purposeful news, and by encouraging public debate.”53 
But it can be argued that traditional journalism outlets cannot substantively achieve the 
democratic functions they set out to promote when they establish themselves as 
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democratic stewards.54 Rather than dedicating themselves to promoting democratic 
participation, journalists might instead approach their craft with the spirit of a public 
journalist—drawing from the perspectives of ordinary citizens and encouraging civic 
engagement—and also as a government watchdog, sometimes acting as an adversary 
to those who would seek to manipulate public opinion.55 
 
A Shrinking Industry 
 The chicken-egg phenomenon of journalism in the last several decades is that 
both the size of traditional newsrooms and the public’s trust in the press as an institution 
have declined since the 1970s. For example, University of North Carolina researchers 
have been tracking reductions in the journalism industry for years, finding that more 
than one in five newspapers has closed since 2004—and, in addition, some 
newspapers have been cut so drastically that they are effectively “ghosts” of their former 
selves.56 As of 2018, fewer than 12 cities had two competing daily newspapers.57 As of 
2020, at least 1,800 communities that had their own newspapers in 2004 now have no 
local news coverage.58 Between 2005 and 2020, the U.S. lost more than 25 percent of 
its newspapers, and half its local journalists.59 Just between 2018 and 2020, more than 
300 newspapers closed and more than 6,000 journalists lost their jobs, while print 
newspaper circulation declined by 5 million.60 The coronavirus pandemic has only 
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exacerbated this decline.61 Unsurprisingly, these reductions have resulted in diminished 
coverage of state and local governments—leaving people to process politics and 
government primarily through a national lens.62 This shift contributes to polarization, 
driven in part by the intensity and partisan rancor that prevails in national political 
coverage.63 
 These cuts have come at the same time that political power has transferred from 
the federal government to state governments, thanks in part to President Ronald 
Reagan’s efforts toward decentralization. As state governments have grown more 
powerful, they have attracted more attention from lobbyists who see opportunities to 
make policy changes away from the nation’s capital.64 In other words, as the presence 
of lobbyists has grown in state capitals, the presence of state press corps has shrunk.  
 As traditional newsrooms have shrunk, the age and experience levels of the 
reporters dedicated to covering state and local government have also decreased.65 
Ehrenhalt weighed the pros and cons of this shift this way:  
“This was not entirely for the worse: the old-timers knew everything about 
everybody but were frequently too close to their sources to put it in the paper. 
The newer reporters were perfectly willing to publish whatever they knew. The 
problem was that they rarely knew very much. And so the readers didn't know 
very much either.”66 
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At the same time that newsrooms and statehouse coverage have declined, so 
has public trust in the press.67 However, it is worth noting that this decline, with voters 
becoming “increasingly critical of press performance,” began as early as the mid-
1970s—shortly before the documented trend in shrinking newsrooms and political 
coverage began in earnest.68 It is likely that some of this distrust is associated with 
general negative attitudes toward government and politics, especially if one subscribes 
to the view of media as a political institution.69 Studies have also shown that individuals 
who feel dependent on traditional media have more trust in the institution, while those 
who are skeptical of traditional media demonstrate more interest in alternative 
sources—which have grown more prevalent as traditional sources have declined—and 
then feel less dependent on traditional sources.70 
 
The Relationship Between Democratic Participation and the Press 
 The relationship between reduced newsroom staffing and political participation is 
unclear based on existing research. Several recent studies have found relationships 
between coverage of political issues in specific communities and voting in those 
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communities, and one in particular found that, after the Ann Arbor (Michigan) News 
closed, presidential and gubernatorial turnout was relatively static, but turnout in local 
elections declined.71 
 A 2014 study sought to determine whether the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
attacks would spark a renewed interest in politics among U.S. citizens.72 The study 
found that the attacks had little effect on news consumption, but did lead to increased 
interest and enthusiasm among Republican voters—and it drew no conclusions about 
voter turnout.73 This suggests major news events may not necessarily provoke major 
political action. A study conducted five years later found that, while reductions in 
revenue and resources result in newspapers assigning fewer reporters to cover politics 
and government, the primary impact of those staffing cuts is “to reducing the volume of 
political coverage, rather than to alter how politics gets covered.”74  
 Still, other studies have shown that media reductions and media distrust have an 
effect on political polarization. A 2018 study found that, in communities where local 
newspapers were shuttered, the rate of split-ticket voting in national races decreased by 
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1.9 percent.75 The authors argued that voters relied more on national news sources to 
make political decisions when they no longer had access to local coverage—and, as a 
result, may have lost sight of some state and local implications.76 An earlier study 
demonstrated that partisan voting gaps grew with respect to increased distrust of the 
media. When a voter distrusts the press, party identification becomes the most 
influential factor at the ballot box.77 
 Supplementing these examples of polarization is research that has demonstrated 
that people who are exposed to more media coverage—regardless of the partisan slant 
of that coverage—are more likely to vote.78 At the same time, questions remain about 
the value of participation as opposed to deliberation. Several studies have shown that 
increased political participation might come at the expense of political deliberation. That 
is, polarized voters may be more likely to participate in the political process, but they 
may be less likely to consider other perspectives—and voters who are exposed to 
competing perspectives may be less likely to participate in politics.79 If the goal of the 
press is to encourage both deliberation and participation, the “deliberative-democratic 
watchdog” model might be most appropriate, as explained by Dzur:  
Journalists interested in promoting deliberation would ideally combine the 
adversarial attitude with the communally engaged standpoint of public journalism. 
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From the adversarial attitude they would draw keen attention to moves of political 
strategy and attempts to manipulate the flow of public information. Such attention 
is needed to assess formal declarations of deliberative norms, such as "I believe 
this policy is in the best interests of the community, not just my supporters," in 
political contexts where formal declarations are less costly than attempts to 
actually live up to the norms. From public journalism they would draw the use of 
non-elite sources for news, and engagement in the community. Such 
engagement is needed to determine what and who is left out of public 
discussions and official decisions.80 
 
Methodology 
 This chapter explores the relationship between statehouse coverage and political 
participation through a set of case studies. This approach allows for a more in-depth 
examination of trends in a defined set of states rather than a broad view that favors 
quantity over nuance. I have selected three states to study. Ideally, this sample would 
have comprised a “red” state, a “blue” state, and “purple” state (based on partisan 
voting trends in presidential, gubernatorial, and legislative elections—but weighted 
primarily toward presidential outcomes) with similar populations and with legislative 
sessions of similar durations. However, most states with full-time legislatures or nearly 
full-time legislatures tend to be “blue” states in presidential elections—and even within 
the classifications of “full-time” and “part-time,” there is room for variation.81 Rather than 
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split states into those two categories, the National Conference of State Legislatures 
classifies states as “green” (full-time, well-paid, large staff), “gold,” (part-time, low pay, 
small staff), and “gray” (hybrid).82 This required me to look beyond legislative session 
length and to consider population as an additional controlling factor.  
 Based on population, length of legislative session, and political diversity in 
presidential elections, the three most appropriate states for this case study are 
Wisconsin—a “purple” state with a full-time legislature (rated “green lite”); 
Massachusetts—a “blue” state with a full-time legislature (also rated “green lite”); and 
Oklahoma—a “red” state with a legislature that is in session an average of four months 
per year (rated “gray”).83 These three states range in population from 3.7 million to 6.5 
million, according to 2012 figures.84 Having placed a priority on political diversity, 
followed by population similarity, followed by length of legislative session, these three 
states are a useful grouping.  
 
Case Studies 
 A 2014 Pew Research Center study found 1,592 reporters assigned to cover 
state capitols; the number of reporters assigned in each state was found to correlate 
with the state’s population and the length of the state’s legislative session.85 This study 
is the most recent comprehensive assessment of state government coverage across the 
country, and in many regards the first and only of its kind. Further examination of trends 
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in state capitol press coverage requires an assessment of records specific to each 
state, which are imperfect. For example, the number of reporters listed as credentialed 
members of the media covering a state capitol may exceed the number of reporters 
assigned to cover the capitol on a full-time basis. This is illustrated in Wisconsin, where 
some TV stations obtain credentials for several reporters but only assign one, if any, to 
a full-time state government beat—nonetheless, all of those reporters are listed in state 
records as credentialed reporters covering the capitol.  
 
Wisconsin 
 The 2014 Pew study found that Wisconsin had 39 reporters assigned to cover 
the state capitol, 19 of whom did so full-time.86 Two were assigned to cover the 
statehouse only during the legislative session, 16 covered it part-time, and two were 
categorized as students or “others." Based on the state’s 2012 population of 5.69 million 
people, Wisconsin had 0.69 full-time statehouse reporters for every 100,000 residents.87  
 Wisconsin’s capitol press corps has expanded and contracted over time. In 1961, 
20 reporters—all employed by print publications—were credentialed to cover the state 
legislature.88 Just nine years later, 32 print reporters and 38 TV and radio reporters had 
capitol credentials.89 Press corps membership hit its peak in 1981, with 39 credentialed 
print reporters and 50 TV and radio reporters, but by 1989 it was down to 25 print 
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reporters and 13 in broadcast.90 A decade later, the credentialed press corps had 38 
total members, split roughly evenly between print and broadcast.91 In 2009, membership 
was up to 44, again split relatively evenly between print and broadcast, but with the 
addition of three internet-based correspondents.92 The most recent data available lists 
13 print reporters, 18 broadcast reporters, and three internet-based reporters.93 
 Because the focus of this thesis is on political coverage and participation at the 
state level, the most relevant elections to study are midterm elections, when the most 
state-level races are on the ballot: the governor, the entire state Assembly, and half of 
the state Senate. However, it is important to note for context, Wisconsin’s presidential 
voting history. From 1960 through 2020, Wisconsin voted for a Democratic presidential 
candidate in 62.5 percent of elections.  
 From the 1962 election through the 2018 election, Wisconsin elected six 
Democratic governors and five Republican governors. Republicans and Democrats 
shared control of the legislature—with one party controlling each chamber—for 
approximately 26 percent of this time period. Republicans controlled the entire 
legislature for approximately 39 percent, and Democrats controlled it for approximately 
34 percent. Democrats enjoyed their longest period of legislative power from the mid-
1970s through the early 1990s, while Republicans have occupied both the legislative 
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and executive branches almost without interruption since 2011 (see fig. 1). The late 
1990s through the late 2000s offered the most instances of shared party control in 
Wisconsin’s capitol.  
 
Figure 1. Partisan control of Wisconsin legislature, 1962-2018. 
  
The Wisconsin Elections Commission calculates voter turnout based on the 
estimated number of eligible voters in the state. Much like the rest of the country, 
Wisconsin’s midterm turnout soared to record levels in 2018, with 61 percent of the 
voting-age population casting ballots. This followed midterm turnouts of 55, 50, and 51 
percent in 2014, 2010, and 2006. From 1986 to 2002, turnout hovered between 39 
percent and 46 percent, reaching its high point in 1998. And from 1962 to 1982, turnout 
ranged to 52 percent in 1962 to 39 percent in 1974.94 
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 The 2014 Pew study found that Massachusetts had 32 reporters assigned to the 
Massachusetts state capitol, 15 of whom were assigned to cover state government full-
time. Seven were categorized as part-time and nine were classified as students, with 
one categorized as “other.” Based on the state’s 2012 population of 6.5 million, 
Massachusetts had 0.49 reporters covering state government full-time for every 
100,000 residents. From 1960 through 2020, Massachusetts voted for a Democratic 
presidential candidate in 87.5 percent of elections.  
 Massachusetts’ state government has not offered a detailed account of its 
credentialed press corps since the early 2000s, but maintained records in earlier years. 
For the purpose of this research, I was able to obtain some recent data from reporters 
currently covering state government. In 1961, 30 reporters were credentialed to cover 
the state capitol. Ten years later, there were 35. By 1981, Massachusetts listed 36 print 
reporters and 21 broadcast reporters assigned to the statehouse. In 1991, 31 print 
reporters had capitol credentials, with 13 broadcast reporters. A decade later, 31 print 
reporters and seven broadcast reporters were registered with the State House Press 
Association.95 A 2019 count listed a total of 21 credentialed reporters.96 
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 From the 1962 election through the 2018 election, Massachusetts has elected 
seven Democratic governors and nine Republican governors. Democrats have had 
control of the Massachusetts legislature since 1959. 
 Unlike Wisconsin, Massachusetts does not calculate voter turnout based on 
estimated eligible voters; instead, the state bases its estimates on the number of 
registered voters. To properly compare Massachusetts with Wisconsin, I have 
measured the number of votes cast against the number of voting-age citizens as 
estimated by the U.S. Census Bureau. This is an imperfect calculation, and data for 
some years is unavailable. 
 In 2018, 50 percent of Massachusetts’ estimated voting-age population voted in 
the state’s midterm election. That level is just one point higher than turnout in the state’s 
2002, 2006, and 2010 midterm elections, but six points higher than the 2014 election. 
Midterm turnout in 1986 and 1998 was 40 and 41 percent, respectfully, but soared to 52 
percent in 1990.97 
 
Oklahoma 
 The 2014 Pew study found that Oklahoma had 21 reporters assigned to its state 
capitol; 17 of whom were assigned to cover state government full-time. Two were 
categorized as part-time and two were assigned to the capitol only during the legislative 
session. Based on the state’s 2012 population of 3.7 million, Oklahoma had 0.56 full-
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time state government reporters per 100,000 residents. From 1960 through 2020, 
Oklahoma voted for a Republican presidential candidate in 93.8 percent of elections.  
 Unfortunately, Oklahoma does not have a readily available list of the reporters 
assigned to cover its state capitol, leaving this research to rely on a handful of news 
clippings—hardly a scientific measure. I was able to enlist the help of several 
Massachusetts state government reporters to track down information that was not 
readily available for that state, but efforts to do so in Oklahoma were unsuccessful. A 
2009 report published in the Oklahoma Gazette is now unavailable, but has been 
referenced by other media outlets and research organizations. According to an 
Oklahoma Policy Institute blog post referencing the original article, the Oklahoma state 
capitol press corps peaked in 1978 at 39 credentialed reporters. At the time the 
Oklahoma Gazette article was published in 2009, the number was reported to be “in the 
teens.”98 
 From the 1962 election through the 2018 election, Oklahoma has elected six 
Democratic governors and six Republican governors. Since 1960, Democrats have 
controlled the Oklahoma legislature for approximately 75 percent of the sessions, with 
split-party control for just two sessions. Since 2009, Republicans have controlled both 
chambers of the Oklahoma legislature. 
 Like Massachusetts, Oklahoma does not calculate voter turnout based on 
estimated eligible voters; instead, the state bases its estimates on the number of 
registered voters. Again, I have measured the number of votes cast against the number 
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of voting-age citizens as estimated by the U.S. Census Bureau. This is an imperfect 
calculation, and data for some years is unavailable. 
 Like Wisconsin and Massachusetts, Oklahoma saw an increase in voter turnout 
in the 2018 midterm election, at 40 percent—the highest it had been since 2002. In the 
elections in between those dates, turnout varied: 28 percent in 2014, 37 percent in 2010 
and 36 percent in 2006. Based on the years of data available, turnout reached a high in 
1990, at 48 percent, followed closely by 47 percent in 1986 and 46 percent in 1982. It 
declined to 42 percent in 1994 and fell again to 35 percent in 1998.99 
 
Analysis 
 It could be expected that voter turnout in statewide elections would decrease 
over time, in correlation with decreased statehouse reporter staffing. However, the 
states studied do not present conclusive evidence that this is the case. 
 During the time period studied, midterm voter turnout in Wisconsin was at its 
highest when the number of credentialed state capitol reporters was at its lowest, with 
20 reporters in 1962 and 34 reporters in 2018. Although the number of press corps 
members declined from 2014 to 2018, turnout increased. When the number of capitol 
reporters exceeded 60, turnout was in the high 40- and low 50-percent range. The 
number of state government reporters was 38 in two of the years studied. In one of 
those years, turnout was 39 percent; in another, it was 48 percent. Wisconsin does not 
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appear to show a strong connection between voter turnout and the number of reporters 
assigned to cover the state capitol. 
In Massachusetts, the data set available is not complete enough to draw any 
clear conclusions. However, once again based on the data available, there does not 
appear to be a strong connection between statehouse coverage numbers and voter 
turnout levels. Turnout levels in Massachusetts have not varied dramatically over the 
last 30 years, while the size of the state capitol press corps has declined by more than 
half. 
In Oklahoma, the data set available is also not complete enough to draw any 
clear conclusions. In any case, Oklahoma would be better served by more extensive 
available data regarding press coverage and voter turnout. 
 
Conclusion 
It is clear that the number of reporters dedicated to covering state capitols has 
generally been on the decline since the 1980s. What is not clear is whether that 
reduction in journalism resources has had any measurable effect on democratic 
participation, and, more specifically, on voter turnout. The cases studied in this analysis 
did not offer conclusive evidence of any connection between the number of state 
government reporters and voter turnout, and in the state with the most data available, 
there did not appear to be any strong relationship. 
 Further research on this topic would benefit from a wider sample that includes 
states with more extensive data available on both turnout and press corps numbers. It 
would also be beneficial to explore additional measures of democratic participation. This 
34 
could include anecdotal evidence based on interviews conducted with residents of the 
states being studied, polls measuring satisfaction with government, trends in voter 






















Chapter Two: Partisan News Media and Political Engagement 
Origins of the Partisan Press in the United States 
 In 1789, John Fenno’s semiweekly newspaper, The Gazette of the United States, 
was launched with the support of the federal government.100 As tensions between 
Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton and Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson 
grew, Fenno’s newspaper increasingly took the side of Hamilton and his supporters. In 
response, Jefferson lent his support to Philip Freneau and his National Gazette, 
launched in 1791.101 As the Hamilton-Jefferson split was formalized with the formation 
of two warring parties, the Federalists and the Republicans, newspapers served as 
partisan tools used to mobilize supporters.102  
“The extent of the objectivity manifest in the mainstream media of today is not 
only unusual, it would strike observers from earlier times as morally offensive,” political 
science scholar Si Sheppard noted in 2008.”103 Indeed, in 1797, William Cobbett wrote, 
in his pro-Federalist Porcupine’s Gazette, that to “profess impartiality here, would be as 
absurd as to profess it in a war between Virtue and Vice, Good and Evil, Happiness and 
Misery.”104    
The “apogee of the party press” arrived with Andrew Jackson’s 1824 presidential 
election loss to John Quincy Adams.105 For the next four years, Jackson built a “far-
reaching network of partisan newspapers” financed with party and government funds. 
                                                          
100 Cook. Governing With the News. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Sheppard, Si. The Partisan Press. 
104 Ibid, 19. 
105 Cook. Governing With the News, 29. 
36 
The newspaper network’s sole purpose was to create and mobilize a national political 
party, and the partisan press seemed to increase citizen involvement enough for 
Jackson to be successful. In 1828, he was elected president. Under the Jackson 
administration, the government subsidization of the press reached new levels.106 For 
example, Jackson gave the Senate and House’s lucrative printing contracts to Duff 
Green, owner and editor of the United States Telegraph, at an estimated profit margin of 
24 percent.107 During the same time period, dozens of editors were given “plush political 
appointments.”108 The press and the political system formed a symbiotic relationship, 
each supporting and relying on the other.   
 
Objective Journalism as a Media Norm 
  In the decades after Congress first signaled its acknowledgment of journalism as 
an independent industry by turning over credentialing authority to the press and its 
Standing Committee of Correspondents, elected officials at every level have learned 
how to interact with the press.109 President William McKinley made himself readily 
available to reporters’ inquiries.110 President Theodore Roosevelt set aside a room for 
the White House press corps and viewed and engaged with them as public servants.111 
House Speaker Newt Gingrich deployed extreme rhetoric because he knew it would 








earn him coverage.112 President Donald Trump has followed Gingrich’s lead, and taken 
his strategy to new heights.  
As modern journalism has come to be dominated by objectivity and autonomy, 
journalists have placed an increased value on autonomy, or interpreting the story with a 
more analytic approach.113 “By any stretch of the imagination, modern journalism does 
not deliver the ‘marketplace of ideas’ that is so vital to the exercise of informed and 
engaged citizenship,” argue political science scholars Shanto Iyengar and Jennifer 
McGrady.114 
Since the apex of the objective news media—Walter Cronkite leading the anchor 
desk at CBS News in the 1960s and 1970s—it has been in an “advanced state of 
collapse.”115 If, however, media organizations were more transparent about their 
political preferences, “the supply of substantive, issue-oriented coverage could be 
increased.”116 Since the 1980s, a new kind of journalist-as-a-political-actor has 
emerged: the partisan newsperson.  
 
The Emergence of Modern Partisan Media 
 Enacted in 1949, the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) Fairness 
Doctrine required broadcasters to present balanced perspectives on controversial 
issues.117 Most media and political scholars agree the 1987 repeal of the Fairness 
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Doctrine under President Ronald Reagan played a significant role in fostering the 
partisan media that permeates the airwaves and the internet today. The rejection of the 
mandate led to prioritization of horizontal diversity—a variety of perspectives across 
television and radio stations—rather than vertical diversity—a variety of perspectives 
within each station’s programming. Another historical factor that has been posited to 
have paved the way for more partisan media was the fall of the Soviet Union in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Americans were no longer united by the common enemy of 
communism, allowing them to fall back into partisan disagreements.118 
The rise of partisan media can also be attributed to technological advances, 
which make it easier to offer more choices for niche audiences, as much as it can be 
attributed to economic forces that support the product.119 Partisan news is now more 
accessible than ever, thanks to the expansion of TV and internet access.120 The more 
choices available on TV and on the internet, the more economically viable it becomes to 
tailor content to a narrow audience.121 While cable television and talk radio expanded 
the availability of narrowly tailored programming, the internet has lowered the cost for 
people to access politically agreeable content, and to then discuss that content with a 
likeminded audience.122 
The 1990s and 2000s ushered in a trend of media ownership consolidation, 
sparked in part by the passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which significantly 
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increased the number of local newspapers and television stations that individual 
corporations could own.123 As of 2018, Sinclair owned and operated 234 TV stations in 
108 markets, reaching 71.5 percent of the U.S. population, and iHeartMedia owned or 
operated 856 radio stations in 160 markets.124 Gannett and GateHouse Media, which 
merged in 2019, published 613 newspapers in 2020, with a combined circulation of 
more than 8 million.125 All of this data is constantly changing due to mergers, 
consolidations, closures, and sales. More than one in five U.S. newspapers have closed 
in the last 15 years, and more than 50 percent have changed ownership in the last 
decade.126 One-third of all U.S. newspapers are owned by just 25 chains.127  
“The most aggressive response to the loss of local newspapers has come from 
the several hundred digital news outlets that span the country, most of them started in 
the past decade by journalists,” journalist and scholar Penelope Muse Abernathy 
observed in her recent analysis of “news deserts.”128 In addition to the objective digital 
news outlets and other startups that have launched in response to the diminishment of 
traditional media, partisan media outlets have also begun to fill the void, in some 
markets more than others. 
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Partisan news presents facts within a framework that bolsters one position while 
suggesting the converse is wrong.129 Within that framework, coverage relies more on 
attacks on the opposition than on content supporting a like-minded candidate.130 
Political news is presented as a battle between two parties, candidates, or causes, thus 
priming and activating viewers’ own partisan identities.131  
 According to a 2016 Pew Research Center study, 57 percent of adults in the 
United States “often” get their news from TV. Thirty-eight percent often get their news 
online, while 25 percent hear it on the radio and 20 percent read it in a print newspaper. 
About one-third of those who favor TV news watch it on cable channels, like CNN, Fox 
News, or MSNBC.132  
Despite the contemporary preference for digital media sources and the 
proliferation of partisan choices within the digital arena, an overwhelming majority of 
people still get their political news from centrist media sources.133 However, at the same 
time, a small segment of partisan individuals consume a large amount of heavily 
partisan news.134 Because those individuals tend to be the most politically engaged, it 
can be argued they exert an undue influence on politicians and elected officials who act 
in accordance with their opinions. Additional research suggests this is true: ideological 
polarization is stronger among the most well educated and politically engaged 
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individuals—the population segment with which political elites are most likely to be 
concerned.135 
Why do people consume congenial news (content that aligns with and supports 
their beliefs)? Several theories have been posed. These include:  
 the partisan polarization hypothesis: posits that people may prefer to encounter 
information that is supportive of and consistent with their beliefs;  
 the issue public hypothesis: suggests that people may pay attention to this 
content because they have an interest in particular policy issues; and  
 the attentive public hypothesis: suggests people may be exposed to specific 
political content simply because they have a general interest in politics.136 
 Studies conducted in the early 2000s showed that people were more influenced 
by issues than party identification in their pursuit of information on the internet.137 Those 
who were guided by partisan affiliation were more likely to be Republicans or 
conservatives.138 People were more likely to seek information based on their personal 
interest in issues like abortion or national defense.139 These studies should be updated 
to determine whether the same results hold true today.  
 
Studying the Effects of Partisan Media 
 A thorough assessment of the effects of partisan media should examine its 
influence on both political activity and political attitudes. It has been argued that “any 
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effect partisan media have on our discourse, or our leaders, is likely to be negative.”140 
But that argument addresses just one element of the question this chapter seeks to 
answer: whether partisan media makes citizens today more or less engaged, and how 
polarization affects that engagement.  
 There is not much research studying whether people are more strongly 
influenced by content that reinforces their beliefs or content that attacks the beliefs of 
their perceived opponents—but researchers generally agree people are influenced most 
strongly by content that reinforces their beliefs than by neutral content or content that 
challenges their beliefs.141 Studies spanning decades in the late 20th century and early 
21st century show that negative information is more persuasive than positive 
information.142 One-sided negative coverage on cable television influences viewers 
more than one-sided positive coverage.143 Other studies show that people who 
consume media aligning with their beliefs are more politically active, more likely to 
participate in campaigns, and more likely to vote early.144 In contrast, some research 
indicates the consumption of counter-attitudinal content depresses some forms of 
political engagement outside of voting.145  
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 Pro-attitudinal news increases individuals’ intentions to participate in the political 
process as compared with balanced news or counter-attitudinal news.146 This can be 
explained by the finding that exposure to congenial news increases individuals’ 
understanding of the issues being covered, which in turn increases their belief that they 
are qualified to participate in the political process. Indeed, this environment puts heavy 
consumers of partisan news, no matter how well educated they are, in a position to 
“take in more misinformation and hold more incorrect beliefs than their less educated or 
less partisan counterparts.”147 
At a less significant level, research also shows that pro-attitudinal news evokes 
positive emotions, along with anger toward the “other” side. The same anger effect is 
the only significant emotional result of exposure to counter-attitudinal content.148  
 In general, consuming like-minded media “makes viewers feel more negatively 
toward the other party, have less support for bipartisanship, less trust in the other side 
to do what’s right for the country,” as observed by political scientist Matthew 
Levendusky.149 The increased political activity that results from participants who are 
divided—increasingly so due to partisan media—serves to foster gridlock and make 
politics more dysfunctional.150 
 Most research on the subject indicates consumption of partisan or ideological 
news content leads to increased levels of both polarization and engagement. There is 
also a “silver lining” in this, observed by a group of researchers led by Magdalena 
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Wojcieszak: “Self-selection into likeminded news is generally viewed as harmful due to 
polarization. Its consequences for participation are not similarly regrettable.”151  
However, the engagement prompted by partisan news content may be driven by 
partisan rhetoric, which dissuades people from compromise and bipartisanship. In 
addition, while people may believe they are qualified to participate in the political 
process based on the reinforcement they have received from pro-attitudinal news 
sources, that belief may be rooted in an incorrect understanding of the issue.152 In other 
words, partisan and ideological content encourages the most extremely partisan voices 
to participate in the political process, therefore elevating those voices in the public 
discourse. This elevation of partisan voices may, in turn, cause more moderate voices 
to withdraw.153 
 
Flaws and Gaps in Existing Research 
The most significant gap in the body of work available on this issue is in the 
number of studies conducted within the last decade. So much has changed with regards 
to the proliferation of ideological and partisan media within the last 10 years, not to 
mention the last five, that it is difficult to accept the results of any research conducted 
prior to that timeframe as gospel.  
Studies on the effects of partisan cable news and talk radio are useful, but do not 
account for the ways the internet has changed the media landscape. Research on the 
subject is only just now starting to examine the effects of more heavily partisan online 
                                                          




media, such as Breitbart on the right or the Daily Kos on the left, and the effects of 




Figure 2: The Media Bias Chart. July 2020. Ad Fontes Media. https://www.adfontesmedia.com/. 
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Several researchers examining the effects of partisan media have listed the 
inability of elected officials and politicians to communicate directly with their constituents 
as a factor in this field of study. Cook argued: “Journalists would serve the public and 
politics more completely if they stopped seeking the same kind of professional 
monopoly traditionally employed by lawyers and doctors. . . . They should realize the 
philosophical benefit if political actors can communicate directly to the public.”154 Since 
the late 2000s, this avenue of communication has been readily available through social 
media, the long-term effects of which are only beginning to be assessed. In addition, the 
amplification effects of social media have yet to be fully explored in regards to their 
effect on partisan media consumption.  
 
Methodology 
 This chapter examines the relationship between partisan and ideological news 
media and political engagement of its consumers through a set of case studies. My 
definition of “partisan media” is narrow for the purposes of this analysis, limited to 
publications that either state an ideological or partisan mission, or that are known to 
receive funding from ideological or partisan sources. There are, of course, traditional 
news media that are perceived to “lean” in one direction or another (as seen in fig. 2); 
however, those are more difficult to quantify than publications with obvious ties to a 
political goal. This approach allows for a more in-depth examination of trends in a 
defined set of states, while also including a broader, national view. I have selected three 
states to study, which will be held up in comparison to the United States as a whole. For 
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the sake of consistency, I assess the same three states I examined in the first chapter 
of my thesis, which explored the relationship between statehouse coverage and political 
participation. This study will focus on these three states—Wisconsin, Massachusetts, 
and Oklahoma—while providing national context. 
 
Case Studies 
 Claims of media bias date back decades. These claims have most frequently 
been made by Republicans and conservatives alleging that the “mainstream media” 
fails to fairly represent conservative views.155 In the 1988, 1992, and 1996 elections, 92 
percent of claims of media bias were made by Republicans alleging media coverage 
favored the liberal viewpoint.156 Those claims, along with diminished public trust in the 
media, have paved the way for the emergence and growth of media outlets with 
partisan influences.157 At the national level, this is easily illustrated by warring cable 
news networks—Fox News catering to the right and MSNBC to the left—but examples 
of partisan media also exist at the state level. 
 
Wisconsin 
 Wisconsin, with an estimated population in 2019 of 5.8 million, has been—
especially in the last decade—the site of hard-fought political battles and razor-thin 
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election margins. It also has been home to a variety of ideologically-influenced and 
partisan-backed media outlets, most of which have set up shop within the last 10 years. 
The partisan media landscape in Wisconsin has been dominated for the bulk of 
the last decade by conservative outlets and content, presented digitally and on the 
radio. In recent years, some of these outlets and programs have shuttered or shifted 
their approach. In the years following Republican President Trump’s 2016 victory and 
Democratic Gov. Tony Evers’ 2018 victory, Wisconsin has seen the launch of a liberal 
radio station and several digital outlets with liberal influences. 
 Conservative Wisconsin news outlets soared to prominence in the late 2000s 
(approximately 20 years after conservative talk radio became popular, particularly in the 
southeastern corner of the state), after the Tea Party movement caught fire in 
Wisconsin and throughout the country—and especially once Republican Gov. Scott 
Walker was elected in 2010, serving with the backing of a Republican-controlled 
legislature. MediaTrackers—billed as a “watchdog dedicated to promoting accountability 
in the media and government across Wisconsin,” was launched in 2011 and funded by 
American Majority, a national conservative organization with Tea Party roots.158 The 
organization had presences in states including Ohio, Florida, Montana, and 
Pennsylvania before shutting down in 2019.159 Around the same time, the Franklin 
News Foundation—established as the Franklin Center for Government and Public 
Integrity in 2009—launched a national network of state-focused news sites under the 
Watchdog.org umbrella, funded with a grant from the Sam Adams Alliance (the Sam 
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Adams Alliance also helped launch American Majority, which funded the MediaTrackers 
organization).160 Wisconsin was home to a Watchdog.org news site until Watchdog.org 
rebranded nationally as The Center Square in 2019.161 As of 2020, The Center Square 
operates state-level news sites in 25 states including Wisconsin. Also founded in 2009, 
the John K. MacIver Institute for Public Policy operates as both a think tank and news 
service promoting “free markets, individual freedom, personal responsibility and limited 
government” and, in 2020, unsuccessfully sued Evers’ administration for excluding the 
organization from press briefings and email lists.162  
 Founded in 2013, RightWisconsin serves as a home for original conservative 
editorial content and for posts from other conservative sites, like the MacIver Institute.163 
The website was sold in 2016 by Charlie Sykes, who, for years, was one of Wisconsin’s 
most influential talk radio voices.164 In addition to selling the website, Sykes ended his 
long-running radio show in 2016—at that time one of few anti-Trump voices in the 
state’s conservative media environment.165 A similarly formatted website, Empower 
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Wisconsin, was launched in 2019, headed by a Republican former state representative 
and by conservative political strategist Eric O’Keefe (the former head of several national 
conservative organizations including the Sam Adams Alliance).166 Featured columnists 
on the site include O’Keefe, conservative radio host Vicki McKenna, and Republican 
former Gov. Scott Walker.167 
 In addition, Metric Media, which operates 1,211 sites designed to resemble local 
or state news in all 50 states, operates 17 sites in Wisconsin.168 Content published by 
Metric Media sites has a conservative bent.169 The network is connected to Locality 
Lab/LocalLabs, a descendant of the now-defunct publishing company Journatic.170 The 
network primarily publishes press releases, gas prices and articles credited to Metric 
Media News Service. The company has been shown to publish content benefiting 
conservative candidates and causes, and does so in Wisconsin.171 As reported by the 
New York Times, Metric Media “is built not on traditional journalism but on propaganda 
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ordered up by dozens of conservative think tanks, political operatives, corporate 
executives and public-relations professionals.”172 
 For decades, conservative outlets have outshined liberal outlets both in quantity 
and in prominence. Former editor of The Progressive magazine Matt Rothschild 
phrased it this way in a 2020 interview with Wisconsin Public Radio: “Frankly, it’s taken 
forever for left-wing donors to recognize the importance of competing in the media 
arena.”173 The liberal Center for Media and Democracy, founded in 1993, publishes 
advocacy journalism on its PR Watch website.174 It describes itself as a watchdog that 
investigates the “corruption that undermines our democracy, environment, and 
economic prosperity.”175 CMD receives funding from left-leaning sources including the 
Rockefeller Family Foundation, the Marisla Foundation and the Park Foundation.176 
Although its focus is primarily national, The Progressive magazine—founded in 1909—
is based in Wisconsin and, like PR Watch, covers Wisconsin politics with a progressive 
slant, billing itself as “a voice for peace, social justice, and the common good.” 177 The 
Progressive and CMD briefly merged in 2014, but separated several months later.178  
 In 2016, iHeartMedia ceased airing progressive political programming on a 
Madison-based radio station that had previously broadcast both local and nationally 
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syndicated shows.179 The following year, the co-host of a local show that had previously 
aired on the iHeartMedia station launched his own liberal radio network, broadcasting 
on AM and FM stations that reached voters in the state’s biggest Democratic 
strongholds (Madison and Milwaukee).180 
 The liberal media landscape in Wisconsin expanded further in 2019 and 2020, 
with the launch of the Wisconsin Examiner and Up North News. The Wisconsin 
Examiner, launched in 2019, describes itself as “a nonpartisan, nonprofit news site 
offering a fresh perspective on politics and policy” following “Wisconsin’s great 
progressive tradition.”181 The Wisconsin Examiner is part of the States Newsroom 
network, which operates about a dozen similar outlets throughout the United States.182 
States Newsroom was launched as a sponsored project of the Hopewell Fund, which 
primarily funds causes and organizations associated with the left.183 Several months 
after the launch of the Wisconsin Examiner came the launch of Up North News, a self-
described “progressive news site” created to “empower and inspire Wisconsinites to 
take part in their democracy.” Up North News is part of the Courier Newsroom network, 
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which operates seven state-level news sites. The network is owned by the Democratic 
firm ACRONYM and funded additionally by other private investors.184 Courier—which 
Facebook eventually classified as a political organization required to report its ad 
spending—spent more than $8 million boosting its stories on Facebook in the 2020 
election cycle, $560,000 of which went to promoting Wisconsin-based content.185 
Wisconsin is also one of 34 states to receive coverage from American Ledger, a blog 
site hosted by the progressive research firm American Bridge.186 
 Using the parameters of the first chapter of this thesis, I will review data from 
midterm elections. This is the time period when the most state-level races are on the 
ballot: the governor, the entire state Assembly, and half of the state Senate. For the 
sake of comparison with national politics, I also review presidential election data. 
 The Wisconsin Elections Commission calculates voter turnout based on the 
estimated number of eligible voters in the state. As shown in Figure 3, Wisconsin’s 
midterm turnout soared to record levels in 2018, with 61 percent of the voting-age 
population casting ballots. These record turnout numbers mirrored trends nationally. 
This followed midterm turnouts of 55, 50, and 51 percent in 2014, 2010, and 2006. From 
1986 to 2002, turnout hovered between 39 percent and 46 percent, reaching its high 
point in 1998. And from 1962 to 1982, turnout ranged from 52 percent in 1962 to 39 
percent in 1974.187 
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 Figure 4 shows that Wisconsin saw its lowest presidential election turnout in two 
decades—at 67 percent—in the 2016 presidential election.188 Seventy percent of the 
voting-age population voted in the 2012 and 2008 presidential elections. From 1984 to 
2004, turnout hovered between 58 percent (in 1996) and 73 percent (in 2004).189 And 
from 1964 to 1980, turnout ranged from 63 percent (in 1972) to 69 percent (in 1964); 
turnout was 67 percent in 1980 (see fig. 4).190 
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 Wisconsin has benefitted from several state-based polling projects over the last 
few decades, conducted by the University of Wisconsin-Madison, St. Norbert College 
and the Marquette University Law School. 
 The Marquette University Law School poll has earned a reputation as the “gold 
standard” of Wisconsin polling since its launch in 2011.191 It has surveyed Wisconsin 
voters not only on horse-race questions and policy positions, but also on how politics 
factor into individuals’ lives and behaviors, including media consumption.192 In October 
2013, 65 percent of voters felt they were qualified to participate in politics (this is the 
only time the Marquette poll has asked this question).193 And despite changes in the 
way people consume news, the level of attention paid to politics by Wisconsin voters 
has remained relatively steady. In January 2012, 88 percent of voters said they paid 
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attention to politics most or some of the time; 87 percent said the same in March 2020. 
The lowest this percentage has fallen was 82 percent, at several points throughout 
2014.194 
 The Marquette Poll frequently asks voters if the state is headed in the right 
direction or the wrong track. The “right direction” measure hit its lowest point in April 
2015, at 43 percent, and its highest in March 2020 at 61 percent. From 2012 through 
early 2020, the average “right track” rating has been 52 percent (see fig. 5).  
 
 Over the same period of time, 80 percent of Republicans have rated the state as 
being on the right track, compared to 47 percent of Democrats and 26 percent of 
independents. The state was governed by a Republican for all but two of those years. 
Favorability ratings for that governor (Walker) ranged from 36 percent in September 
2015 to 50 percent at several points in 2012 and 2013. From 2012 through 2018, 85 
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percent of Republicans and 45 percent of independents viewed Walker favorably, 
compared to just 12 percent of Democrats. Evers, the Democrat elected in November 
2018, had a 20 percent favorability rating in March 2018 (before he was elected); that 
was his lowest point. His highest favorability rating came in March 2020, at 54 percent. 
From 2018 to 2020, 68 percent of Democrats and 31 percent of independents viewed 
him favorably, compared to 13 percent of Republicans.195 
 
Massachusetts 
 With an estimated population of about 6.9 million, Massachusetts has been a 
fairly reliable “blue” state over the last half-century, having voted for a Democratic 
presidential candidate in 87 percent of elections from 1960 through 2016. 
 Perhaps because the state’s liberal bona fides are hardly in question—in addition 
to voting “blue” in most presidential races, the state legislature has been under 
Democratic control since 1959—very few partisan news outlets (following the 
parameters of this thesis and not accounting for traditional publications with perceived 
partisan leanings) have set up shop in Massachusetts in recent years. As of April 2020, 
none of the liberal-backed news networks with presences in Wisconsin had outlets 
operating in Massachusetts, including American Ledger, which had presences in more 
than half the country. 
 While there is an absence of liberal-backed media outlets in Massachusetts, 
Metric Media LLC operates 16 hyperlocal news sites throughout the state.196 In Maine, 
the outlets bear names like Cape Cod Ledger and Mid Massachusetts News. A mid-
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2019 review of its Massachusetts properties did not indicate much, if any, overtly 
political activity, but by 2020 the sites appeared to display some content with a 
conservative slant. 
 Massachusetts also saw a burst of conservative-backed media activity in 2015, 
with the launch of two conservative talk radio stations and a conservative news site.197 
NewBostonPost, founded in 2015, bills itself as “the hub of conservative thought.”198 
One of the two stations converted to a conservative talk format in 2015, WMEX-AM, has 
since transitioned to an oldies format; the other, WKOX-AM, is now a gospel station.199 
Since 2018, WXKS-AM has broadcast the conservative programming that had 
previously run on WKOX.200 In addition, WRKO-AM has been home to conservative 
host Howie Carr for more than two decades.201 
 Unlike Wisconsin, Massachusetts does not calculate voter turnout based on 
estimated eligible voters; instead, the state bases its estimates on the number of 
registered voters. To similarly compare Massachusetts with Wisconsin, I have used 
data from the United States Election Project, which measures the number of votes for 
the highest office on the ballot compared to states’ voting-age population.202 Data for 
elections before 1980 is unavailable from the Election Project.  
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 In 2018, 50 percent of Massachusetts’ estimated voting-age population voted in 
the state’s midterm election—a high also reached in 1990. The next-highest turnout 
years were 1982 and 1994, at 47 percent. The lowest-turnout election during this time 
period was in 1986, at 37 percent (see fig. 6).203 
 
 In the 2008, 2012 and 2016 presidential elections, Massachusetts saw turnouts 
of 61 percent, 60 percent and 69 percent, respectively. Fifty-nine percent of eligible 
voters cast ballots in 2004, an uptick from 55 percent in 2000. From 1980 to 1996, 
turnout ranged from 54 percent (1996) to 60 percent (1992) (see fig. 7).204  
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 Massachusetts does not have a singular poll that has consistently taken the deep 
dives that Marquette has in Wisconsin; however, there are several polling efforts that 
can be analyzed. Like some of the Wisconsin polling projects, not all results for these 
polls are currently accessible. The UMass Poll, based at the University of 
Massachusetts Amherst, has provided political polling for Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire and national races since 2010. The University of Massachusetts Lowell has 
also conducted political polling since 2011. Suffolk University conducts both national-
level polling and state-level polling, and has collected data on Massachusetts voters 
since 2004. These polls have mostly focused on specific races rather than general 
temperature checks of the state’s electorate. 
 UMass Lowell:  
o Direction of the country: In September 2011, 62 percent of 
Massachusetts voters said the country was on the wrong track.205 
                                                          




o Voter qualifications: Two polls conducted in 2014 found that 43 percent 
of Massachusetts voters believed other people can be trusted to make 
intelligent, informed voting decisions. Independents were essentially 
evenly split on this question; 51 percent of Democrats believed in other 
voters, compared to 44 percent of Republicans.206  
 UMass Amherst: 
o Direction of the country and state: Seven years after the UMass Lowell 
poll mentioned above, a November 2018 poll found similar results: 68 
percent of voters said the country was on the wrong track. However, the 
same percentage said the state was headed in the right direction under 
moderate Republican Gov. Charlie Baker (see fig. 8).207 
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o Trump, the news media and violent incidents: Sixty-one percent of 
those asked in November 2018 if Trump’s rhetoric had contributed to a 
series of violent incidents replied that they strongly or somewhat agreed. 
Another set of respondents was asked if they agreed the mass media had 
contributed to the violent incidents; 49 percent strongly or somewhat 
agreed. Fewer voters were undecided about Trump’s role than the 
media’s role, and more voters strongly disagreed that Trump contributed 
than those who strongly disagreed that the media contributed.208 
o Trust in media: Fifty-four of voters surveyed in November 2018 said they 
trusted local radio and TV stations, compared to 21 percent who said they 
did not trust them. Thirty-three percent said they trust the Boston Globe 
and the Boston Herald (24 percent for the Globe, 9 percent for the 
Herald), compared to 30 percent who did not trust the newspapers. It 
should be noted that the Herald’s editorial section leans conservative 
while the Globe’s trends liberal.209 Eighteen percent of voters said they 
trust CNN, followed by 16 percent who said they trust MSNBC and 12 
percent who said they trust Fox News. While less than 30 percent of 
voters said they didn’t trust MSNBC or CNN, 44 percent said they did not  
trust Fox News (see fig. 9).210 
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 Suffolk University: 
o Direction of the state: With the exception of 2008, most Massachusetts 
voters have tended to think the state is on the right track in the 2000s and 
2010s; the highest point for this measure was in 2018 (69 percent) and the 
lowest in 2008 (35 percent) (see fig. 10).211 
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o Trust in media: Asked which media source they trusted most, 25 percent 
of voters in an October 2014 poll named Fox News, followed by 15 
percent who named NBC, 14 percent who were undecided and 13 percent 
who named CNN. Just 6 percent named MSNBC.212 Asked in April 2015, 
24 percent named Fox News, followed by 11 percent each who named 
NBC and CNN, and 9 percent each who named ABC or were undecided. 
Seven percent named MSNBC.213  
 
Oklahoma  
 With an estimated population of about 3.9 million, Oklahoma has been a reliably 
red state in presidential elections for the last five decades, having voted for the 
Republican candidate 93 percent of the time from 1960 through 2016.  
 Like Massachusetts, Oklahoma has not seen the flood of partisan-backed media 
outlets that battleground states like Wisconsin have in recent years. A review for this 
analysis found few partisan-backed news sites in Oklahoma. The American Ledger 
published one blog post critical of Kevin Stitt, then the state’s Republican candidate for 
governor, in 2018.214 Metric Media operates 15 sites featuring generalized content.215 
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The Oklahoma Conservative, a quarterly print publication with an online news site, bills 
itself as “Oklahoma’s conservative newspaper since 1979” and, once a year, ranks state 
legislators on its “conservative index.”216 The Oklahoma Observer, which describes 
itself as “the state's leading source for progressive news and commentary,” started 
publishing in 1969.217 
 Similar to Massachusetts, Oklahoma does not calculate voter turnout based on 
estimated eligible voters; instead, the state bases its estimates on the number of 
registered voters. Again, I have used data from the United States Election Project to 
assess turnout. 
 Oklahoma, like Wisconsin and Massachusetts, saw an increase in voter turnout 
in the 2018 midterm election, at 40 percent—the highest it had been since 1994. In the 
elections in between, turnout varied: 28 percent in 2014, 36 percent in 2010 and 34 
percent in 2006 (see fig. 11).218 
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In the 2008 presidential election, 53 percent of Oklahoma’s voting-age population 
turned out, followed by 46 percent in 2012 and 52 percent in 2016. From 1984 to 2004, 










 Founded in 2004, SoonerPoll — an independent, nonpartisan poll run by 
ShapardResearch — has conducted public opinion research in Oklahoma.220 The poll is 
regarded as “the most respected in the state” and conducts both on its own and in 
partnership with news outlets.221 SoonerPoll has measured voters’ perceptions of state 
government, news media and political parties: 
 Perceptions of news sources: A poll conducted in May and June 2010 
found that 51 percent of voters had a negative opinion about “mainstream 
media” (examples given were ABC, NBC and CBS), while 37 percent had a 
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positive opinion. Voters were evenly split on their opinions of CNN’s 
coverage, but positive opinions of Fox News outweighed negative opinions by 
27 points. Fifty-two percent of Democrats had a positive opinion of 
mainstream outlets, compared to 21 percent of Republicans. Seventy-three 
percent of Republicans had a positive impression of Fox News, compared to 
43.8 percent of Democrats.222 Following the November 2004 election, all 
voters thought news media had covered the two candidates in the U.S. 
Senate fairly, although they felt coverage had slightly favored the Democratic 
candidate (see fig. 13).223 
 
 Opinions of political parties: In March 2011, 55 percent of voters favored 
the Oklahoma Republican Party, compared to 39 percent of voters who 
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favored the state Democratic Party.224 But in May 2018, Democratic voting 
enthusiasm (52 percent) was approaching Republican enthusiasm levels (54 
percent).225 Between August 2017 and January 2018, the percentage of 
voters who wanted Republicans running state government dropped by about 
10 points, to 46 percent; however, Republicans still topped Democrats, who 
had the faith of 33 percent of voters.226 
 Direction of the state: Fifty-one percent of voters in October 2016 said the 
state was moving in the wrong direction, compared to 38 percent who said it 
was on the right track.227 A poll conducted in July 2016 found that 
Oklahomans were overall dissatisfied with government; just 39 percent 
viewed Republican Gov. Mary Fallin favorably down 16 points from November 
2015 and down 32 points from her all-time high in May-June 2013), while 36 
percent viewed Democratic President Barack Obama favorably. The state 
legislature scored poorly too, viewed favorably by 34 percent of voters.228 
Amber Integrated, a public affairs firm founded in 2019, also conducts 
statewide polling in Oklahoma, and has measured voters’ perceptions of 
news media and elected officials: 
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 Preferred news sources: In April 2020, 58 percent of Oklahoma voters said 
they prefer watching news on TV, followed by 16 percent who go online, 9 
percent who listen to the radio and 7 percent who read a newspaper. 
Republicans and Democrats had relatively similar news consumption habits 
with the exception of TV and radio; 11 percent of Republicans prefer radio 
compared to 6 percent of Democrats, and 64 percent of Democrats prefer TV 
compared to 56 percent of Republicans.229 
 Handling of the coronavirus pandemic: Trump, federal agencies, 
Republican Gov. Kevin Stitt and the state legislature all received high marks 
for their handling of the coronavirus pandemic, with approval ratings all 
topping 60 percent in April 2020. However, only 44 percent approved of the 
way Congress handled the pandemic, and 49 percent approved of the 
national news media’s approach. Oklahoma news media fared better, with a 
71 percent approval rating. Republicans and Democrats were sharply divided 
over the national news media’s approach (72 percent of Democrats approved, 
compared to 33 percent of Republicans), but the gap was smaller for local 
media (8 points, with more Democrats in approval). Democrats and 
Republicans were even on their approval of Congress, but sharply divided on 
Trump (a 61-point gap, with more Republicans in approval). More 
Republicans approved of state officials’ handling than Democrats, but all by 
margins of less than 10 points.230 
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 The United States has an estimated population of 328 million people. Since 
1969, the population has grown by 125 million. In that time period, the country has 
elected six Republican presidents and three Democratic presidents. Congress has been 
controlled entirely by Democrats 47 percent of that time, by Republicans 31 percent of 
the time and under split control 22 percent of the time. Congress was under divided 
control for much of the 1980s, and again in the late 2000s and the 2010s.  
 National turnout in presidential elections since 1972 was at its lowest in 1996, at 
52 percent, followed by 1988 at 53 percent, 1980 and 2000 at 54 percent, and 1996 at 
55 percent. Turnout peaked at 62 percent in 2008, followed by 60 percent in 2004 and 
2016, 59 percent in 2012, and 58 percent in 1992 (see fig. 14).231 
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National turnout in midterm elections since 1970 cratered in 2014, at 37 percent, 
followed by 1986, 1990 and 1998 at 38 percent, 1972 and 1976 at 39 percent, and 2002 
and 2006 at 40 percent. Midterm turnout reached its peak in 2018 at 50 percent, 
followed by 47 percent in 1970, 42 percent in 1982 and 41 percent in 1994 (see fig. 
15).232 
 
 The rise, fall and subsequent rise of partisan and ideological news outlets at the 
national level was largely laid out earlier in this chapter. With that knowledge in hand, it 
is worth examining recent studies of news consumption and attitudes toward the news 
media. 
Pew Research Center 
A Pew Research Center study released in January 2020 found that “Republicans 
and Democrats place their trust in two nearly inverse news media environments.”233 In a 
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survey listing 30 news media sources, Democrats trusted, more than distrusted, 22 of 
them — while Republicans distrusted, more than trusted, 20 of them (see fig. 2).234 
“Another way to look at the diverging partisan views of media credibility: Almost half of 
the sources included in this report (13) are trusted by at least 33% of Democrats, but 
only two are trusted by at least 33% of Republicans.” (see fig. 16)235  
 
Figure 16: U.S. Media Polarization and the 2020 Election. Pew Research Center. 
 




The study also found that more than 50 percent of Democrats trusted five 
mainstream news sources, but Fox News was the only news source to top 50 percent 
(at 65 percent) for Republicans (see fig. 17). Compared to a similar Pew study 
conducted in 2014, Republicans’ distrust grew for 15 of the 20 sources asked about in 
both surveys, while Democrats’ trust changed “considerably less.”236 
 
Figure 17: U.S. Media Polarization and the 2020 Election. Pew Research Center. 
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The 2020 Pew study found that Fox News and CNN were the country’s top 
sources for political news—39 percent of Americans received political news from them. 
They were followed closely by NBC News, ABC News and CBS News, at 34, 33, and 30 
percent respectively, then by MSNBC at 24 percent and National Public Radio at 20 
percent. The New York Times and the Washington Post were named by 20 percent and 
17 percent of those surveyed. The study found that about 20 percent of voters in each 
party are in a “tight” political news bubble (primarily consuming news from a source with 
a similarly-minded political audience).237  
A 2014 Pew report identified 33 ideological outlets providing state government 
coverage in 25 states, all but one associated with Republican or conservative leanings. 
At the time, these reporters accounted for approximately 2 percent of all full-time 
statehouse press.238 
In 2018, more than two-thirds of Americans told Pew they had participated in 
politics within the last five years (“by volunteering for or donating to campaigns, 
attending protests or meetings, contacting officials or expressing their views on social 
media”). The likelihood of participating in a political activity was about equal between 
the two parties, but the parties differed in the types of activities in which they were most 
likely to engage.239 A 2009 Pew study, which presented different measures of time, 
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found that nearly two-thirds of Americans had participated in politics within the last 
year.240 The 2009 survey did not provide party-specific data on participation. 
Gallup 
Gallup has tracked the American public’s trust in news media since 1973, when it 
was measured at 68 percent. It hit its apex in 1977, at 72 percent, and declined 
gradually until 1997, when it fell to 53 percent. Since 1997, the highest point for trust in 
media was in 1999, at 55 percent. Trust in media reached its lowest point in 2017, at 33 
percent, then rebounded to 41 percent in 2019.241 In 1972, 75 percent of Americans 
surveyed by Gallup indicated a great deal or fair amount of trust in government; this 
measure was at 50 percent toward the end of 2019.242 
Other polls 
There are, of course, far more national polling resources available than there are 
state-specific studies. The following polls were compiled by the Roper Center for Public 
Opinion Research: 
 Presidential approval: Since 1970, the lowest approval ratings any 
presidents received were Republican President George W. Bush, at 19 
percent in February 2008, and Republican President Richard Nixon, at 23 
percent in January 2004. Other presidents’ lowest ratings were in the high 
20s to high 30s. Bush also claims the highest approval rating of this set, at 92 
percent in October 2001. His father, Republican President George. H.W. 
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Bush, came close behind at 89 percent in February 1991. All other presidents’ 
highest approval ratings fell in the high 60s to high 70s, with the exception of 
Donald Trump, whose highest documented approval rating was 49 percent in 
March 2019.243 
 Media in the 1980s and 1990s:  
o In 1979, 80 percent of Americans said the news media provide 
information that is essential to democracy.244 In 1976, 86 percent said 
they trusted the news media “some” or “a lot,” and in 1981, 85 percent 
said the major news media did a good or excellent job reporting on 
major issues.245  
o In 1989, 62 percent of Americans rated the ethics and honesty of 
members of the news media as “good” or “excellent,” and the previous 
year, 46 percent said they believed media coverage was fair (20 
percent perceived a liberal bias and 10 percent perceived a 
conservative bias).246 Also in 1987, Americans were relatively split 
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between TV (35 percent) and newspapers (33 percent) as the most 
reliable sources for news; radio was named by just 7 percent.247  
o A decade later, 66 percent of those polled said they tended to believe 
the news media when government officials denied reports.248 In 1999, 
45 percent of Americans rated the news media’s performance as good 
or excellent, and another 35 percent rated it as fair, and 56 percent 
said they trusted the news media somewhat or a great deal.249 The 
previous year, 42 percent of Americans saw TV news as the most 
biased (42 percent), followed by newspapers (23 percent); 8 percent 
said all media was biased—but, while 46 percent described local news 
media as “general good” or “informative,” only 17 percent said the 
same of national news media. At the same time, 6 percent described 
local news media as “over the top” or “biased,” while 23 percent said 
the same of national news media.250  
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 Media in the 2010s: In 2012, most Americans (57 percent) said they 
received their political news on television and from cable news networks. This 
was followed by 22 percent who frequented newspapers and magazines 
(online or in print) and 9 percent who named radio.251 These  In 2017, more 
Americans thought the news media were immoral (30 percent) than moral (24 
percent), but 44 percent believed neither label applied.252 A September 2018 
poll found that 54 percent of Americans trusted news media to tell them the 
truth, as opposed to 30 percent who trusted Donald Trump more.253 In August 
2018, 65 percent of Americans saw the news media as an important part of 
democracy, while 26 percent felt the phrase “enemy of the people” came 
closer to their view.254 The same year, 70 percent of Americans said they had 
no confidence, or very little confidence, in the news media.255 
 
Analysis 
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 Much of the existing literature can be boiled down to this premise: the prevalence 
of partisan media can be associated with increased political engagement; however, it 
can at the same time be associated with increased political polarization. The cases 
analyzed in this review neither confirm nor negate this premise; however, they do 
contribute details and data points that could be useful in further reviews. 
 The scope of this review is, of course, limited by the case studies, as only one of 
the three states has had an abundance of partisan media coverage in the last decade. 
Wisconsin also has more consistently available, in-depth, statewide polling data than 
Massachusetts and Oklahoma. 
It is impossible to know whether participation or polarization would have been 
affected in Massachusetts or Oklahoma had either state seen more partisan news 
coverage during the same time period. With the data assessed in this study, it is also 
impossible to isolate the presence of partisan media as the sole factor contributing to 
any given change in political behavior at a state or national level. 
 However, the lack of concrete conclusions does not preclude the finding of 
observations worth further exploration: 
 Election turnout: Both Massachusetts and Wisconsin have tended to outpace 
the United States in both midterm election turnout and presidential election 
turnout, while Oklahoma has largely kept pace with the nation—until the 2000s, 
when it started to fall behind. All three states, and the U.S. as a whole, saw an 
uptick in midterm turnout from 2014 to 2018. Among the case studies, Wisconsin 
had the only instance of a decrease in turnout in the 2016 presidential election. 
While Wisconsin has more partisan news outlets than the other states in this 
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study and its turnout generally outpaces the others, there is not sufficient 
evidence to assert a strong connection between partisan media and voter turnout 




 Attitudes toward media: Wisconsin voters would appear to have more trust in 
the news media than voters at the national level, although it is difficult to compare 
polls not conducted in the exact same time frame and with differences in the 
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wording of questions. It is clear from polls that Massachusetts and Oklahoma 
voters trust their local news media far more than they do national outlets. Overall, 
trust in the traditional or “mainstream” media has declined at every level over the 
last several decades, and the trend does not appear to be on a course to 
reverse. Over a period of four decades, the percentage of Americans who saw 
the news media as essential or important to democracy fell 15 points. Data from 
Oklahoma, the “red” state in this study, indicates that Fox News—a conservative 
media source—is trusted more than other sources that are considered to be 
neutral. Data from Massachusetts, the “blue” state in the duty, indicates that 
voters tend to trust local news media over national cable TV networks, and 
neutral or liberal outlets over conservative sources. It would be useful for this 
stud, to have similar information available about the attitudes of Wisconsin 
voters. 
 Perception of the direction of the state and country: For most of the last 
decade, Wisconsin voters have perceived the state as being headed in the right 
direction; the perception that the state was on the wrong track led from 2015 to 
2017, and voters were relatively evenly split at two points in 2018 and 2019. In 
the last decade, the percentage of Wisconsin voters who believe their state is on 
the right track has not caught up to the percentage of Massachusetts voters who 
believed that of their state in 2018. While Wisconsin’s right direction/wrong track 
numbers have been nearly evenly split, Massachusetts has been trending 
upward with a relatively large gap favoring those who believe the state is moving 
in the right direction since 2008. Oklahoma does not have adequate data 
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available for an effective comparison. While this is not enough to conclusively link 
partisan media consumption to polarization in attitudes toward state government, 
it is worth noting that Wisconsin—a swing state with a significant number of 
partisan news publications—is far more divided on this measure than 
Massachusetts, a generally reliably blue state with fewer partisan news sources, 
comparatively. 
 Partisan divisions: Both state and national data reviewed in this study point to 
stark and growing differences in the way Democrats and Republicans view the 
world. This is especially true of the way the two parties perceive news media. It is 
clear that the overall level of trust and value in traditional news media is on a 
downward slope, and that the strongest negative perceptions are held by 
Republicans. While Democrats tend to trust a larger variety of news sources a 
moderate amount, Republicans have trust in very few—and instead place the 
most trust in a cable network that hews conservative. Both parties, however, still 
tend to favor local news sources over national outlets—but in spite of that, local 
newsrooms are shrinking and disappearing. 
 
Conclusion 
 Despite a centuries-old commitment to objectivity as a journalistic standard, the 
growth of partisan and ideologically influenced news in the last several decades is not a 
first for the United States. It is, however, a relatively new phenomenon for voters to 
have a choice between “objective” or “traditional” news media and news media that 
promote or discourage a particular point of view. This choice has been increasingly 
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available at a national level since the 1980s, primarily via TV and radio. State-based 
coverage with a partisan or ideological influence has become more prevalent in the 
2000s and 2010s, and continues to evolve into the 2020s—but some states have 
experienced this more than others.  
 Existing literature supports the theory that an increased availability of partisan 
news is connected to heightened political engagement, along with heightened 
polarization. The case studies in this thesis do not contradict this theory, but they also 
do not add significant evidence to strengthen it. 
 Several questions remain: Has partisan media driven polarization, or has it 
emerged in response to political cleavages? What effect might state-level partisan 
media have in reliably “red” or “blue” states like Oklahoma and Massachusetts, as 
opposed to a swing state like Wisconsin? Although many conservative/Republican 
outlets were formed because of a perceived bias against conservative viewpoints in the 
mainstream news media, liberal/Democratic outlets have not emerged in response until 
relatively recently—how will that change the news media landscape and its effects on 
voters? Do voters value objectivity over reinforcement? Do voters value being exposed 
to perspectives different from their own?  
 Further research on this topic would benefit from a broader sample including 
additional states that could be held up in comparison to the benchmarks in this study—
in particular, states with extensive data documenting voters’ electoral participation, 
attitudes toward media, attitudes about political discussions, and perceptions of 
government. It would be helpful to study a mix of “red,” “blue,” and “purple” states, as 
well as a mix of states with varying degrees of partisan media saturation. 
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 The relationship between modern partisan media and political engagement is not 
likely to be a static or easily defined data point in the near future. It will warrant 
continued observation as both the political and media environments evolve. 
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Chapter Three: The Press and Polarization in Wisconsin 
‘Wisconsin, not Washington, D.C.’ 
As governor of Wisconsin, Scott Walker reminded voters and lawmakers on 
multiple occasions that “this is Wisconsin, not Washington, D.C.” in an effort to inspire 
confidence that, even at its most challenging moments, the Badger State was above the 
perceived dysfunction of politics in the nation’s capital.256 “We actually get things done 
here in this state by working together,” Walker, a Republican, said following a 2018 
meeting during which he sought support from state Senate Republicans for a number of 
initiatives he had proposed ahead of a reelection bid.257  
 The truth is more complicated than the catchphrase. While dysfunction in 
Madison has earned national headlines since Democrat Tony Evers defeated Walker in 
November 2018, polarization plagued Wisconsin government even before it faced the 
challenges of having a Democrat heading the executive branch while Republicans held 
control of the legislature. A National Conference of State Legislatures review of 10 state 
legislatures during their 2015-16 sessions found that Wisconsin was one of five states 
that were “substantially more polarized” than Congress, based on the Shor-McCarty 
state legislative ideology measure.258 A July 2019 review, also based on the Shor-
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McCarty measure, ranked Wisconsin as the 11th most polarized state in the country, 
and an October 2020 analysis found that Wisconsin had the least active full-time state 
legislature in the nation since state governments started taking steps to fight the 
COVID-19 pandemic.259 Wisconsin has been presented as a cautionary tale of what 
happens when Republican-led legislatures fight to limit the powers of Democratic 
governors as they seek to limit the spread of the coronavirus: “You don't even need to 
look any further than the explosion of cases in Wisconsin to see how damaging (a court 
ruling limiting a governor’s emergency powers) is,” former Centers for Disease Control 
director Dr. Tom Frieden said in an NBC News report highlighting these battles in 
Wisconsin and Michigan.260 
 Much research has already been conducted to identify factors that contribute to 
polarization and gridlock. In this final chapter, I will focus on Wisconsin and, while 
acknowledging other significant events and factors, will assess the role that changes to 
the state’s media landscape may have played in Wisconsin’s ascent to becoming one of 
the country’s most polarized, least active state governments. 
 
From La Follette to McCarthy 
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 Wisconsin’s politics have long encompassed ideologies at opposite ends of the 
spectrum. Robert “Fighting Bob” La Follette, a national leader in the Progressive 
movement, served as a congressman, governor, and U.S. senator, and has been called 
“the most celebrated figure in Wisconsin history.”261 Twenty-two years after La Follette’s 
death, Wisconsin elected Joseph McCarthy—one of the most reviled figures in the 
state’s and nation’s history—to the Senate, ousting La Follette’s son, who had carried 
on his father’s progressive legacy.262 In 2010 and 2012, voters sent Tea Party favorite 
Ron Johnson and liberal stalwart Tammy Baldwin to the Senate, where two years later 
they would hold the record for the two senators from the same state who had voted in 
opposition most frequently.263 Within a span of months in 2012, voters rejected an effort 
to recall Republican Gov. Scott Walker and then voted to send Democratic President 
Barack Obama back to the White House.264 A state doesn’t become purple without a 
strong mix of red and blue.265 
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 While Wisconsin has always had room for a wide variety of political persuasions, 
data from 1995-2016 show that its state legislature has become more polarized and 
ideologically separated over time (see fig. 20).266  
Fig. 20: Weinschenk, “Polarization in the Wisconsin Legislature, 1995-2016.” WisContext, July 17, 2019.  
 
Among Midwestern states, Wisconsin is second only to Michigan in its degree of 
polarization—which has steadily increased since the mid-1990s—and among all 50 
states, it is the 11th most polarized (see fig. 21). 
                                                          




Fig. 21: Weinschenk, “Ideological Distance Between Parties in Midwest Legislatures, 1993-2016.” 
WisContext, July 17, 2019.  
 
 Why does polarization matter? Because “the frequency of legislative deadlock 
increases as the parties polarize,” and “polarization and the partisanship that ensues 
more often encourage parties to fight messaging wars than to negotiate.”267 In their 
study of polarization in Congress, Michael Barber and Nolan McCarty found that: 
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. . . polarization has fundamentally altered legislators’ incentives to negotiate. 
Expanding ideological differences and declining dimensionality have increasingly 
replaced win-wins with zero sum outcomes. Increased teamsmanship has 
reduced the number of honest brokers who can effectively work “across the 
aisles” to create agreements. Moreover, polarization has exacerbated the 
incentives for strategic disagreement. It is difficult to negotiate when one or both 
sides think they are better off when bargaining fails.268 
 Most research on the legislative effects of polarization approaches the issue at 
the congressional level. In the absence of a substantial body of work examining the 
question at the state level, I will operate under the conclusion that “most state 
legislatures operate under substantially the same conditions as the Congress.”269 
 
‘Divide and Conquer’ 
 Polarization in Wisconsin has reared its head in battles superficial and 
substantive. Tensions erupted between the two parties in November 2019 over whether 
the evergreen displayed in the state capitol rotunda during the holiday months should 
be called a “Christmas tree” or a “holiday tree.”270 In response to Evers referring to the 
tree as a “holiday tree,” 60 Assembly Republicans and four Assembly Democrats voted 
to officially recognize it as a “Christmas tree,” while most Assembly Democrats argued 
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the resolution was being used to stoke existing political divisions.271 The following year, 
Evers announced that there would be no tree in the rotunda for the holiday season, 
because the capitol building was closed to the public due to the coronavirus 
pandemic.272 Weeks later, two Republican state representatives put up their own tree in 
the rotunda, despite having been denied a permit for the tree by the state Department of 
Administration.273 The legislators said it was “petty” of the governor to skip the tree 
tradition, while the governor’s administration argued it should not spend tax dollars on a 
display that would be inaccessible to the general public.274 
Earlier in 2020, lawmakers were divided along party—and racial—lines for the 
third consecutive year over who should be honored in a state Assembly resolution 
commemorating Black History Month.275 "If we can't come together on the Black History 
Month resolution how are we going to tackle the big issues?" asked Republican state 
Rep. Scott Allen in January 2020, foreshadowing the legislature’s inability to do exactly 
that just a few months later, when the COVID-19 pandemic hit.276 
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 Signs of the division and dysfunction to come emerged before Evers’ 
inauguration as governor. In December 2018, Republican legislators worked through 
the night to pass a lame-duck bill diminishing the powers of the incoming Democratic 
governor and the incoming Democratic attorney general, Josh Kaul.277 Evers, at the 
time, said he would continue to try to find common ground with Republicans in the 
legislature, but "this is going to make it much more difficult."278 
After Evers took office, Republican legislative leaders declined on three separate 
occasions to convene the legislature after Evers called special sessions to address 
specific issues. In response to calls to consider proposals to curb gun violence, adjust 
the administration of an election in response to the coronavirus pandemic, and 
implement policing reforms, Republican leaders gaveled in and gaveled out—
symbolically acknowledging the governor’s request while conveying the message that 
his proposals would not be entertained.279 The legislature passed the state’s first 
COVID-19 relief bill in on April 14, 2020.280 As the coronavirus continued to spread 
throughout Wisconsin, Evers and Republican legislative leaders did not speak with each 
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other for a period of six months.281 At the same time, Republican lawmakers fought 
against measures put forward by the Democratic governor to fight the pandemic, but 
offered no alternative plans or bills until nearly eight months later, on December 1.282  
"State government has just simply failed to respond to an enormous crisis," 
former Democratic Gov. Jim Doyle told the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel.283 Even through 
political disagreements, Doyle said, he was never not on speaking terms with a 
legislative leader during his two terms from 2003 to 2011. The former governor said the 
capitol’s dynamic during the COVID-19 pandemic was less productive than it was during 
the 2008 recession.284 
"Doing the right thing is really the best politics and that’s why you’re elected—to 
do what you think is right and (to) have a plan," former Republican Gov. Scott McCallum 
told the Journal Sentinel. "I see that falling apart."285 
The period between Doyle’s and Evers’ terms was also marked by partisan 
polarization and intense disagreements, led in large part by Scott Walker’s governing 
style. Walker’s leadership was polarizing both because he pushed for such aggressively 
conservative policies, and because of his “shock and awe” approach.286 That was 
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exemplified by his signature policy, known as Act 10. Walker did not campaign on 
eliminating collective bargaining for public employees, but he did just that shortly after 
he took office in 2011, telling a campaign donor he would use a “divide and conquer” 
strategy to advance the policy.287 The move was met with massive protests and a bitter 
recall effort, and resulted in 14 Democratic state senators fleeing the state in a 
desperate effort to block a vote on the bill.288 One national news story previewing the 
June 2012 recall election (in which Walker prevailed) referred to Wisconsin as “the most 
polarized state in the country.”289 Walker’s polling numbers throughout his governorship 
reflect that description. As governor, his average approval rating was 47 percent, and 
his average disapproval rating was 49 percent—an empirical representation of the fact 
that, as he once put it, “there's like two people in this state that don't have a strong 
opinion of me.”290 Opinions were also largely dictated by partisan affiliation. Among 
Republicans, Walker’s average approval rating was 88 percent; among Democrats it 
was 11 percent.291 
Polling conducted by both Gallup and Public Policy Polling during the 2012 
election cycle placed Wisconsin among the top three states in terms of size of the 
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partisan gap in Barack Obama’s approval ratings, and Walker’s partisan approval gap 
(80 points between Republicans and Democrats) was even larger than Obama’s.292 
Data collected in the “gold standard” Marquette Poll since 2011 show that 
polarization has seeped into the interactions of everyday citizens, although its effects 
have fluctuated over time. 
The frequency with which voters say they talk to friends and family about politics 
hit a high point in October 2016, when 52 percent said they discussed politics with 
friends and family more than once a week, and just 6 percent said they never had these 
discussions.293 Its lowest point was in June 2012, when 33 percent said they had these 
discussions more than once a week and 9 percent said they never did. It is worth noting 
that Walker’s recall victory was in June 2012, a little more than a year after Act 10 and 
its fallout.294 Generally, the percentages of voters who either frequently or never 
discussed politics with family and friends remained relatively steady from 2012 to 2018.  
The poll has asked only once whether voters feel comfortable talking about 
politics with friends and acquaintances, or whether they feel like they need to be careful 
with what they say. In August 2020, voters were nearly evenly split: 50 percent said they 
were comfortable and 47 percent felt they needed to watch what they said.295 Slightly 
less than half of voters surveyed said in September 2018 that they hear an equal mix of 
liberal and conservative perspectives from friends and family.296 
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While discussion of politics with friends and family has not changed dramatically 
from 2012 to 2018, more people have decided to stop discussing politics with their 
coworkers. In April 2012, 25 percent of voters said they discussed politics with 
coworkers more than once a week; that declined to 14 percent in August 2018. At the 
same time, the percentage of people who said they never discuss politics with 
coworkers rose from 35 percent in April 2012 to 46 percent in August 2018.297 The most 
noticeable increase in this category occurred from December 2016 to August 2018.298 
In April 2012, 28 percent of voters said they had stopped discussing politics with 
someone due to disagreements over the state’s recall elections or disagreements about 
Walker; in October 2018, 33 percent of voters said they had made this decision. In 
October 2016, the only time the question was asked about the 2016 presidential 
election, 34 percent said they had ceased political discussions with someone because 
of a disagreement over the upcoming election. The poll has asked once if voters had 
stopped talking to someone entirely because of political disagreements; in August 2018, 
18 percent said they had done so.299 It has asked twice if voters had stopped talking to 
someone because of disagreements over the 2016 presidential election; on average, 35 
percent of voters said they had and 64 percent said they had not.300 
 
The Makings of a Swing State 
Wisconsin’s political divisions weren’t always so immovable. In 1994, Republican 
Gov. Tommy Thompson and Democratic U.S. Sen. Herb Kohl both won landslide 
                                                          





victories, with 40 percent of voters splitting their tickets on the two races.301 Thompson 
won the now reliably blue Dane and Milwaukee counties, and Kohl prevailed in now 
reliably red Waukesha County. In 2012, Walker would lose Dane and Milwaukee 
counties by 27 and 39 points, respectively, and Obama would fall 34 points short in 
Waukesha County.302 
While it could be argued that Thompson and Kohl were the type of once-in-a-
blue-moon politicians with a rare ability to appeal to almost anyone, they also existed in 
a far less polarized political landscape. In the state’s 2018 election, which included a 
gubernatorial race and a Senate race, 12 percent of voters split their tickets—and that 
was high, compared to just 5-6 percent in elections preceding it.303 The trajectory of 
Democratic former Sen. Russ Feingold’s races backs up this trend: He earned 19 
percent of the Republican vote in his 1992 U.S. Senate race, and just 6 percent when 
he was ousted by Republican Ron Johnson in 2010. Thompson told the Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel: 
“When I was running for governor, I intentionally went out in the Black churches. I 
intentionally went into the union halls. I went to the Democratic festivities. I did 
that because I wanted to bridge the gap. That kind of politics isn't in vogue 
anymore. (For me) it was, 'How do I expand from 69 or 70 percent to 75 
percent?' People now say, 'How do I get to 50 percent plus one?'”304 
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Politicians are now better served by catering to partisan media, donors, and 
interest groups than by trying to build broad coalitions, Thompson observed.305 The 
Republican former governor, who lost to Baldwin in the 2012 Senate race, has predicted 
(thus far, accurately) that no Republican candidate will ever again carry the liberal 
strongholds of Dane and Milwaukee counties as he did several times throughout the 
1990s.306 
Recent election results indicate Thompson was right. Tony Evers and Lt. Gov. 
Mandela Barnes won Dane County by 52 points, and Milwaukee County by 37 points, in 
2018.307 In the 2020 presidential election, Democrat Joe Biden bested Donald Trump by 
53 points in Dane County, and by 40 points in Milwaukee County.308 Thompson, likely 
the last Republican to do so, won Dane County by 6 points in 1994.309 
In addition to the Marquette Poll, several polls have surveyed Wisconsin voters 
over the last several decades. There is very little data available from the St. Norbert 
College poll, which was founded in 1984, but a review of available data finds that 
Wisconsin voters were most united in their support of a governor in April 1995, when 
there was a 63-point gap between those who approved of Thompson’s performance as 
governor and those who disapproved.310 The largest gap in opinions under Democratic 
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Gov. Jim Doyle came in April 2003, when there was a 44-point difference between 
those who approved of his performance and those who disapproved (by the end of his 
second term, his approval rating was underwater).311 For much of Walker’s tenure, the 
St. Norbert poll measured the gap to be less than 10 percentage points; the largest gap 
came in April 2014, at 20 points (with those who approved of his performance 
leading).312 
The Badger Poll, conducted by UW-Madison and sponsored by the Capital 
Times and the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, surveyed Wisconsin residents from 2002 to 
2011.313 In the first Badger Poll, 63 percent of voters rated Republican Gov. Scott 
McCallum’s job performance as “fair” or “poor,” compared to just 31 percent who gave 
those ratings to Thompson, his predecessor.314 The poll also found that while 
McCallum’s approval ratings were influenced strongly by partisan identification, 
majorities of both parties gave Thompson high marks.315 A 2005 Badger Poll indicated 
deepening partisan divisions in Wisconsin; 49 percent rated Republican President 
George W. Bush’s job performance as excellent or good while 51 percent rated it fair or 
poor. Democratic Gov. Jim Doyle received similar marks.316 At the time, poll director G. 
Donald Ferree, Jr., highlighted the fact that 16 percent of voters rated Bush’s 
performance as excellent while 26 percent rated it as poor, reflecting “deep partisan 
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divisions.”317 In the poll’s final year, partisan tensions erupted dramatically as the battle 
waged over Walker’s efforts to curtail labor rights for public employees.318  
"It's a swing state not because we are all independent. It's a swing state because 
there are people with strong leanings on both sides,” said University of Wisconsin-
Madison political science professor Katherine J. Cramer.319  
 
Factors That Contribute to Polarization 
 So what happened to Wisconsin? Before assessing the role of media, it is 
important to discuss some of the other factors that may have contributed to modern 
polarization in the Badger State.  
 
Redistricting 
 Existing research shows that, despite it being an “attractive narrative,” there is 
little evidence that partisan gerrymandering on its own has a significant causal 
relationship to political polarization.320 Wisconsin’s districts, last drawn in 2011 by 
Republicans, have been ranked among the most gerrymandered in the country.321 
Despite claims from redistricting reform advocates, gerrymandering’s effect on 
polarization ranges from “marginal to undetectable.”322 Nonpartisan redistricting reform 
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is a popular proposal in Wisconsin—70 percent of voters polled in February 2020 
supported moving the state to a nonpartisan process—but it does not appear to be the 
solution to Wisconsin’s polarization problem.323 
 
Act 10 and the Breakdown of Political Talk 
 Scott Walker, in his own words, “dropped the bomb” one month into his first term 
by introducing legislation that effectively eliminated collective bargaining for most public 
employees.324 The bill provoked a legislative standoff between parties, a variety of legal 
challenges, massive protests and smaller counter-protests, heated outbursts from 
lawmakers and state Supreme Court justices, and multiple recall efforts (directed at the 
governor and state senators of both parties).325 The political disagreements that 
followed extended “beyond the formal political domain, deep into many citizens’ 
occupational, media, and interpersonal talk networks.”326 
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Five years later, Republican former state Senate President Mike Ellis told the 
Wisconsin State Journal that the law’s most significant impact would be “the long-lasting 
political division it created.”327  
“Lines were drawn deeper in the sand. Instead of maybe a half an inch in the 
sand they went down two feet. As a result of that time frame, that’s going to be there for 
a generation,” Ellis said.328 
That division resulted in a “widespread breaking down of political talk . . . 
reminiscent of significant political polarization, but in fact extending beyond it,” a group 
of researchers primarily from the University of Wisconsin found years later.329 Personal 
and occupational identities became politicized, rendering family and friends unwilling or 
unable to discuss politics without fear of damaging their personal relationships.330 In 




 Since the late 1980s, “Wisconsin’s political geography has evolved toward a 
spatial realignment that shows the Democrats increasingly dominant of the state’s larger 
cities and a growing conservative counteraction in which the Republican Party 
dominates voting in suburban, exurban, small town, and rural Wisconsin,” as noted by 
geography scholar Kazimierz J. Zaniewski and political science scholar James R. 
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Simmons.332 As a result of that realignment, the state’s largest and medium-sized cities, 
where Democrats are most successful, “are pitted in increasingly partisan elections” 
against expanding Republican strongholds in small towns, rural areas, suburbs, and 
exurbs.333 The correlation between population density and voting tendencies was 
recorded in 2014 as being about four times stronger than it was four decades earlier.334 
 No researcher has captured the underpinnings of Wisconsin’s widening urban-
rural divide than Katherine J. Cramer, whose 2016 book examined “the politics of 
resentment” after nearly a decade of visiting 27 (mostly rural) communities throughout 
the state and sitting down with residents in coffee klatches and other informal 
gatherings.335 Cramer argues convincingly that place matters not only because of its 
correlation with votes, but because it shapes the way people interpret politics.336 The 
sense that rural residents “don’t get their fair share” permeates less-populated 
communities, driving a wedge between Wisconsinites and the government that 
represents them.337  
 In her conversations, Cramer quickly learned that many rural residents feel 
ignored by both government and news media, viewing both as institutions out of touch 
with their lives and communities.338 Cramer observed: 
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If local newspapers are not covering issues relevant to rural residents, the effect 
of that content on rural residents may not be to cause their views to become 
more similar to that of urban residents over time. Instead, it could reinforce rural 
folks’ perception that rural communities like their own are ignored.339 
 
The Role of Media in Polarization 
 In the last 15 years, the United States lost more than 25 percent of its 
newspapers.340 Wisconsin was no exception to this trend, losing 28 percent of its 
newspapers and seeing a 39 percent decrease in newspaper circulation during that 
period.341 In the United States, 225 counties do not have a local newspaper, and 1,528 
(half of all counties) have only one.342 Wisconsin fares slightly better than the nation as 
a whole; just one of Wisconsin’s 72 counties lacks a local newspaper, while 22 have just 
one.343 At the same time that newsrooms and statehouse coverage have declined, so 
has public trust in the press.344 This is only one example—but a significant one—of how 
the media landscape has changed at both the national and state levels over the last 
decade. 
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Media Ownership 
As of 2018, the country’s largest 25 newspaper companies owned 67 (or about 
one-third) of Wisconsin’s nearly 200 newspapers.345 The top five owners in Wisconsin 
are Adams Publishing Group (18 newspapers), Gannett (11 newspapers), Lee 
Enterprises (20 newspapers), Morris Multimedia (10 newspapers), and News Publishing 
Company Inc. (13 newspapers). Of those, only News Publishing Company is based in 
Wisconsin.346 
Gannett acquired the majority of its Wisconsin properties in 2000, although its 
purchase of the state’s largest newspaper, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, did not 
come until 2016.347 Its Wisconsin presence began in 1980 with its purchase of the 
Green Bay Press-Gazette and Wausau Daily Herald. Gannett owns newspapers in five 
out of Wisconsin’s 10 largest cities.348 In 2010, Gannett announced plans to open five 
regional design studios that would produce most of its newspapers’ pages—a move that 
was significant in part because, in tandem with layoffs and consolidations in local 
newsrooms, it has at times resulted in multiple newspapers displaying the same front 
pages (see fig. 22).349 
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Fig. 22: Photos of newspaper front pages from 10 Gannett-owned Wisconsin newspapers on March 5, 
2019. 
 
 There is an extensive body of research indicating that media ownership does 
matter.350 The influence of a large chain is generally not directed specifically at 
individual newspapers; rather, a company’s policies, budgeting decisions, profit quotas, 
and hiring or firing of management trickle down to affect a local newspaper’s 
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operations.351 Consolidation shifts the incentives of news organizations in favor of 
coverage that can be published in multiple markets, rather than content specific to a 
local community.352 It also incentivizes the publication of content that suits the financial 
and political interests of the outlet’s owners.353 
 The legendary (and often controversial) journalist and media critic Ben Bagdikian 
put it this way:  
“No national paper or broadcast station can report adequately the issues and 
candidates in every one of the 65,000 local voting districts. Only locally based 
journalism can do it, and if it does not, voters become captives of the only 
alternative information, paid political propaganda, or no information at all.”354 
 Local media can play a significant role in forming a person’s sense of community, 
shaping their perception of it beyond their immediate interactions with friends, family, 
and colleagues.355 Additionally, readership of local print news sources increases the 
likelihood of an individual’s community participation.356   
 Consolidation of local news organizations does appear to have an effect on 
readers’ trust in the news. A 2019 Gallup survey found that 92 percent of people are 
“very” or “somewhat” worried about the political views of owners influencing the fairness 
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of news coverage. Seventy-seven percent are worried about losing news that is unique 
to their area, and 73 percent are worried about a reduction in resources for news-
gathering and reporting.357 
 In March 2017, 57 percent of Wisconsin voters said they would be more likely to 
believe facts presented by newspaper and television media, while 22 percent said they 
would be more inclined to believe politicians; 18 percent said neither.358 Wisconsin’s 
trust in news media faltered the following year. In June 2018, 45 percent of voters said 
they trusted news media to tell the truth about important issues, while 38 percent said 
they trusted Trump instead; 14 percent said neither.359 
 
Conservative Talk Radio 
 In 2016, conservative talk radio in Wisconsin was influential enough that analysts 
cited it as a significant factor contributing to Trump’s loss to Texas Sen. Ted Cruz in the 
state’s Republican presidential primary (six prominent hosts throughout the state were 
sharply critical of Trump, most of whom would eventually come to support him).360 That 
influence accumulated over a period of approximately 25 years, with former Milwaukee 
radio host Charlie Sykes leading the pack for most of that time.361 When the Federal 
Communications Commission revoked its Fairness Doctrine in 1987, stations pursued 
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the profitable conservative talk model pioneered by Rush Limbaugh and packed the 
airwaves with hosts like Sykes.362 According to Nielsen, in 2014, the 
news/talk/information format accounted for approximately 11 percent of the radio 
audience nationally, but for 17 percent of the audience in the Milwaukee market.363 By 
2016, Wisconsin had 81 radio stations broadcasting 235 hours of conservative talk radio 
per day.364 University of Wisconsin journalism professor Lewis Friedland noted in a 
2018 interview with The Capital Times: 
“You can say there is something in the range of six-plus hours a day of right-wing 
talk radio in every major market in the state, usually on the most powerful AM 
stations in those markets.”365 
Sykes’ show—broadcast from the state’s largest radio signal, reaching much of 
eastern Wisconsin and even part of Illinois—served as both a launching pad and 
megaphone for conservative causes and politicians including Gov. Scott Walker, Sen. 
Ron Johnson and Milwaukee County Sheriff David Clarke, a man whose ego and 
national presence led Sykes to consider him his “Frankenstein monster.”366 In 2013, in 
partnership with WTMJ AM, Sykes launched RightWisconsin, a site featuring news and 
commentary with a conservative bent—often, like his radio show, portraying mainstream 
news sources such as the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel as untrustworthy or biased 
against conservatives. At the time, WTMJ, its corresponding television station, and the 
                                                          
362 Ibid. 
363 Gilbert. “As Split-Ticket Voting Dies.” 






Milwaukee Journal Sentinel were all owned by Journal Broadcast Group. In a 2016 New 
York Times op-ed, Sykes wrote: 
One staple of every radio talk show was, of course, the bias of the mainstream 
media. This was, indeed, a target-rich environment. But as we learned this year, 
we had succeeded in persuading our audiences to ignore and 
discount any information from the mainstream media. Over time, we’d succeeded 
in delegitimizing the media altogether—all the normal guideposts were down, the 
referees discredited. . . . We destroyed our own immunity to fake news, while 
empowering the worst and most reckless voices on the right.367 
While Republicans saw him as a “conscience” for the party, Democrats argued 
he stoked the flames of racism and division that he has since made a career of decrying 
with the start of Trump’s political reign. In an interview, Sykes cited Act 10 as a turning 
point, noting that he stopped making room for diverse voices after its fallout—
contributing to an “amazing divide.”368 When Sykes ended his show in 2016, he was 
viewed by some Republicans—as they embraced the newly victorious Trump—as a 
traitor to the party for continuing to hold the “Never Trump” line. As he left, Sykes 
predicted that Wisconsin’s political divide would only get worse:  
“The people who bet on hyperpolarization, they’ve been empowered. So there 
might have been a reckoning afterwards saying, ‘Hey guys, you cannot go out 
                                                          





there into the fever swamps.’ But the ones who went the furthest out, they are the 
ones who are the big winners right now.”369 
 
Information Diets 
 The Marquette Poll asked frequently about voters’ news consumption habits from 
2012 to 2014, then asked again in 2018. Some dramatic shifts emerged: 
 Daily newspapers: In January 2012, 19 percent of voters said they didn’t 
read a daily newspaper at all during the week. That percentage stayed in the 
teens, 20s and 30s up to January 2014. In September 2016, 51 percent of 
voters said they didn’t read a daily newspaper at all during the week. The 
peak of voters who said they read a daily newspaper every day occurred in 
May 2012, at 43 percent. That percentage was down to 19 percent in 
September 2018 (see fig. 23).370 
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FIGURE 23: HOW MANY DAYS IN THE LAST WEEK 
DID WISCONSIN VOTERS READ A NEWSPAPER?
Every day Three days One day None
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 Local TV news: In January 2012, 13 percent of voters said they did not 
watch local TV news at all during the week; that percentage stayed below 20 
percent up to January 2014. It was up to 28 percent in September 2018. The 
percentage of voters who watched local TV news every day dropped from 48 
percent in January 2012 to 35 percent in September 2018; its lowest point in 
the poll’s measurement (see fig. 24).371 Thirty-eight percent of voters asked in 
September 2018 said they saw an equal mix of liberal and conservative 
content in local TV and newspapers. Twenty-nine percent said local TV and 
newspaper content was mostly or all liberal, while 15 percent said the content 
was mostly or all conservative.372 
 
 Online news: In April 2012, 44 percent of voters said they did not visit online 
news sources at all during the week (to consume local, state or national 

















































































































































FIGURE 24: HOW MANY DAYS IN THE LAST WEEK 
DID WISCONSIN VOTERS WATCH LOCAL TV 
NEWS?
Every day Three days One day None
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news). That figure dropped to 38 percent in September 2018. Unlike daily 
newspaper and local TV news, the percentage of people who said they 
consume online news every day grew from 2012 to 2018—from 22 percent in 
April 2012 to 34 percent in September 2018.373 
 Social media: Similar to online news consumption, frequent social media 
news consumption also increased from 2012 to 2018. In April 2012, 62 
percent of voters said they did not receive news from social media (examples 
listed were Facebook, Twitter and email); that was down to 50 percent in 
September 2018. At the same time, while 17 percent said they received news 
from social media every day in April 2012, 24 percent said they did in 
September 2018. Twenty-eight percent of voters asked in September 2018 
said they encountered an equal mix of liberal and conservative views on 
social media. Twenty-three percent said they encountered mostly or entirely 
liberal content, while 8 percent said they encountered mostly or entirely 
conservative content.374 
 Talk radio: The poll only asked once about talk radio consumption, in 
September 2016. It is unfortunate that there is no data on talk radio listening 
habits from the early 2010s, when it was arguably at its most influential in 
Wisconsin.375 In September 2016, 47 percent of voters said they never 
listened to talk radio shows about politics, while 15 percent said they listened 
every day, 23 percent said they listened one to three days a week, and 12 
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percent said they listened four to six days a week.376 Of those who said they 
listened to political talk radio, 13 percent said they listened to an equal mix of 
liberal and conservative programming, while 11 percent said they listened to 
almost all liberal or mostly liberal with some conservative programming. 
Eighteen percent said they listened to almost all conservative or mostly 
conservative with some liberal programming.377 
 Friends and family: Forty-seven percent of voters asked in September 2018 
said they heard an equal mix of liberal and conservative perspectives from 
friends and family. The percentages of voters who said conversations leaned 
liberal (22 percent) or conservative (24 percent) were effectively evenly 
split.378 
 
 Ahead of the 2020 presidential election, political preference was a relatively 
reliable indicator of voters’ trust in news media. Among voters surveyed in the fall of 
2020, Biden supporters exhibited a higher level of trust in news sources than Trump 
supporters in every category except political talk radio and Fox News. Biden supporters 
were significantly more likely than Trump supporters to trust the New York Times, CNN, 
MSNBC, Wisconsin journalists, and their local TV news station (see fig. 25). 






In Wisconsin, information diets matter. Consumption of traditional news sources 
has not been shown to significantly influence attitudes toward candidates, but a study of 
Wisconsin voters found that use of digital media did strengthen polarized attitudes 
toward Barack Obama.379 This is likely a result of voters’ ability to seek out the political 
information of their choosing online, rather than receive it passively through a print 
newspaper or television broadcast—in turn rewarding existing partisan attitudes.380 
Wisconsinites who talk more with family and friends (likely to be mostly politically 
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Fig. 25: Michael W. Wagner, Trust by Biden/Trump support in Wisconsin, fall 2020. 
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homogenous exposure) have more polarized attitudes about Barack Obama, Scott 
Walker, the Tea Party, and public labor unions.381 However, those who talk about 
politics with their coworkers (likely to be a more heterogeneous set of views) display 
less polarization in their attitudes toward Obama and Walker.382 These effects have 
implications at the ballot box: the more ideologically diverse Wisconsin voters’ media 
diets are—in terms of both news media consumption and personal conversations—the 
more likely they are to split their tickets.383  
 
Conclusion 
 Although analysis of the 2020 presidential election will continue well beyond the 
completion of this thesis, Wisconsin’s role in electoral politics is worth highlighting as an 
illustration of the state’s polarization.384  
 When Donald Trump defeated Hillary Clinton in 2016, he was the first Republican 
to win Wisconsin’s 10 electoral votes since 1984. He did so by a margin of 22,748 
votes. Evers’ margin over Walker in the 2018 gubernatorial election was similarly close, 
at 29,227. In both cases, the margin amounts to about four votes per ward across the 
state. 
 In 2020, Joe Biden flipped Wisconsin back to blue, by a margin of 20,682—
continuing the state’s tradition of razor-thin election margins.385 In 2020, 2016, 2004, 
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and 2000, presidential elections in Wisconsin were decided by less than one 
percentage point.386 Trump continued to perform well in 2020 in rural counties, as he did 
in 2016—while suburban voters shifted slightly Democratic, and Biden performed 
predictably well in Dane and Milwaukee counties. 
 Despite Biden having won approximately the same number of Wisconsin’s votes 
in 2020 as Trump did in 2016, more than a week after Biden was determined by 
unofficial vote counts to be the president-elect, only one elected Republican in 
Wisconsin would say he believed that Biden won the election.387 Of the state’s 81 
Republican state lawmakers, 76 did not respond to reporters’ questions, and four who 
did respond declined to acknowledge Biden’s victory.388 Forty-four of 47 Democratic 
state lawmakers responded, all of whom acknowledged Biden as president-elect.389 The 
same was true at the congressional level; every Republican member of the state’s 
congressional delegation ignored an inquiry from the Washington Post asking if they 
would accept Biden as the legitimately elected president of the United States.390 If the 
two parties cannot agree on an objective fact such as which candidate received more 
votes (in both the popular vote and the Electoral College) for the presidency, it appears 
there is little room for them to agree on anything else. This appears to be a signal that 
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the partisan divide in Wisconsin is more pronounced than ever, and perhaps still 
growing. 
Wisconsin has a rich history of political diversity, but the last decade in particular 
has been marked by deep division that extends beyond the walls of the state capitol. 
There is no smoking gun that explains polarization at the state level, nor is there a silver 
bullet to alleviate it. The available evidence, however, supports the theory that media 
consumption plays a role in polarization. This connection is worth further exploration. 
 From this analysis, several themes have emerged: 
 Consumption of traditional news media has declined, and with it, so has 
the public’s trust in the news media. 
 The “divide and conquer” politics of Act 10 have created lasting fissures in 
Wisconsin’s politics. 
 A robust conservative talk radio presence appears to have hardened 
some of the state’s political divisions. 
 Media consolidation has reduced the amount of local news coverage 
available in cities throughout the state—adding to an existing perception in 
rural communities that they are ignored by government and news media. 
 Sense of place and community identification influence civic participation, 
and local news influences community identity.  
It is worth noting that this analysis was conducted within the first eight months of 
the coronavirus pandemic. Future research should present a more detailed account of 
how elected officials, journalists, and voters responded to the virus and its associated 
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fallout. Interviews with current and former elected officials also would likely provide 
valuable insight, as so much of politics and polarization is personal.  
It is fair to conclude that journalism does have a relationship with polarization, but 
it is difficult to fully isolate its role, as it is intertwined with so many other significant 
factors. But as Wisconsin—and the nation—continues to grapple with its effects, any 



















 Whether serving as watchdogs, lapdogs, or attack dogs, journalists play an 
integral role in our democracy—from city hall, to the statehouse, to the U.S. Capitol. As 
former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter said, “Freedom of the press is not 
an end in itself but a means to the end of achieving a free society.”391 This “fourth pillar 
of democracy” is at risk of crumbling, though, as resources directed toward government 
coverage—particularly at the state level—dwindle and trust in the news media 
plummets.  
 A comprehensive report released in November 2020 by Gallup and the Knight 
Foundation reinforces many of the findings of this thesis, observing “continued 
pessimism and further partisan entrenchment about how the news media delivers on its 
democratic mandate for factual, trustworthy information.”392 As observed throughout this 
thesis, the survey found that party affiliation was the primary predictor of attitudes 
toward news media.393 
 The survey found that 83 percent of Americans perceive a “fair amount” or “great 
deal” of political bias in journalism, but two-thirds of Americans are more concerned 
about the bias in other people’s news sources than in their own.394 Sixty-seven percent 
of Republicans view the news media “very” or “somewhat” unfavorably, compared to 20 
percent of Democrats—and one in seven Republicans believes the news media is trying 
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to ruin the country.395 Most Americans agree that the news media is under political 
attack, but while most Democrats believe it is unwarranted, most Republicans believe it 
is deserved.396  
 There is some good news in the Gallup/Knight report. An overwhelming majority 
of Americans—81 percent—still believe journalism is “critical” or “very important” to 
democracy.397 Between 2018 and 2020, the percentage of Americans who said they 
follow news about their local community “very closely” went up from 25 percent to 33 
percent—and, in keeping with the literature reviewed and arguments made in this 
thesis, people who followed local news closely were more likely to feel attached to their 
communities, vote in local elections, and feel that people like them could have a say in 
what government does.398 And, while 83 percent of Americans believe the news media 
should be blamed “a great deal” or “a moderate amount” for the country’s political 
divisions, the same percentage of people sees “a great deal” or “a moderate amount” of 
potential for news media to heal those divisions.399 
 The findings of this thesis confirm some existing theories on the relationship 
between government and journalism, neither confirm nor negate some other theories, 
and raise questions that should be explored in future research. This work provides 
compelling information and arguments in favor of devoting additional resources to the 
study of the intersection of media and politics. 







 It is encouraging to learn from the first chapter that shrinking statehouse 
coverage does not appear to depress voter turnout. However, there is not sufficient data 
available in two of the three case study states to thoroughly and definitively declare 
whether there is any significant relationship between the size of a statehouse press 
corps and political participation among citizens.  
 Further research in this avenue would benefit from an expanded case study. In 
this analysis, these three states best fit the controlling factors of population, length of 
legislative session, and political diversity in presidential elections—but a more in-depth 
analysis should draw data from a larger number of states to allow for more comparisons 
among states with similar populations, similar legislative operations, similar presidential 
election outcomes, and similar voting regulations.  
 This chapter is also limited by its use of voter turnout as the only measure of 
political participation to be assessed. Future research should consider additional 
measures, including but not limited to: perception of one’s qualifications to participate in 
politics, voter registration trends, attitudes toward government, campaign contributions, 
volunteerism, social media activity, and frequency and quality of political conversations 
with friends, family, and coworkers. As the second and third chapters focus heavily on 
political polarization, it would also be useful to conduct analysis of polarization as it 
relates (or does not) to the size of a state’s press corps. 
 Studying again the states of Wisconsin, Massachusetts, and Oklahoma, the 
second chapter neither confirms nor negates the theory that an expanding partisan 
news landscape leads to increased political participation and increased political 
polarization. People who consume media that reinforces their beliefs are more likely to 
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feel negatively toward the opposite party and more likely to oppose compromise— 
fostering gridlock and, arguably, making politics more dysfunctional.  
 Similar to the first chapter, the second chapter is limited by the inconsistency in 
data available from each of the states being studied. My analysis does not find sufficient 
evidence to assert a strong connection between partisan media and voter turnout, at 
least in some part due to the limitations of data. Findings do indicate a slight preference 
for local news over national news, but there is not enough data available to strongly 
confirm this. It is clear, though, that trust in media is on a downward slope, and that 
negative attitudes toward news media are far more prevalent among Republicans than 
Democrats. 
 The questions raised in the second chapter would again suggest that further 
research would benefit from a broader sample of states, with varying presidential 
election trends and varying degrees of partisan media saturation. Questions that 
warrant further exploration include: whether partisan media has driven polarization or 
emerged in response to growing divisions, how partisan media might exhibit different 
effects in swing states as opposed to reliably “red” or “blue” states, whether voters value 
objectivity over reinforcement of their existing perceptions, and whether voters value 
exposure to different perspectives. 
 Timing is also an issue in this analysis. So many of the partisan outlets noted in 
this chapter are relatively new, particularly those with liberal/Democratic influences. It is 
likely too early to fully assess their impact on the political landscape in any of these 
states, but continued observation will surely be beneficial.  
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 In the final chapter, Wisconsin emerges as a microcosm of the polarization seen 
throughout the United States, demonstrating how rich political differences can be 
hardened into a seemingly incurable chasm between parties.  
 Both consumption of traditional news media and the public’s trust in journalism 
have declined. At the same time, journalistic resources devoted to traditional state 
government have dwindled, and many local newspapers have either been purchased by 
larger corporations or ceased printing altogether. All the while, partisan-influenced 
media outlets continue to set up shop. 
 News media is far from the only factor that has contributed to polarization in 
Wisconsin. Legislative battles have deepened divisions, in many cases changing the 
way people communicate with one another, and in some situations ending relationships 
entirely. Additionally, a spatial realignment has occurred as Democrats flock to urban 
areas and Republicans expand their presence in smaller towns and rural areas.  
 It is difficult to isolate the role of the news media in Wisconsin’s severely 
polarized political environment, but its presence is clear. Even in measures of 
geographic divisions, media emerges as a factor as rural residents increasingly feel as if 
institutions such as government and the news media are out of touch with their lives. 
While local news coverage can lead to increased civic participation, consolidation of 
media ownership appears to affect perceptions of one’s local news sources. Chipping 
away at the “local” element of local news erodes readers’ shared sense of community. 
Additionally, consolidation raises issues of trust among most people, and as people lose 
trust in news media, they become increasingly guided by partisan influence when 
making political decisions like voting. 
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 The influence of conservative talk radio is mostly documented with anecdotes, 
which suggest that, at its strongest point, it served to foment mistrust of mainstream 
media and to reinforce perspectives favored by conservatives and Republicans. 
Additional research should seek to quantify these observations with polling, interviews, 
and more extensive listenership data. 
 The final chapter also identifies a trend in media consumption: in recent years, 
the percentage of Wisconsin voters who read a newspaper or watch local TV news 
every day has decreased, while the percentage who say they never do these things has 
increased. Further research should aim to learn more about why these habits have 
changed, and whether these news sources are being replaced with others. 
 Although polarization in Wisconsin is more dramatic than most other states, its 
recent history can provide a useful window into the factors that deepen political 
divisions, both inside and outside of government. Initial research indicates that the 
changing media landscape and changing media consumption habits—along with a 
variety of other factors—contribute to political polarization. The scholars at the 
University of Wisconsin’s Center for Communication and Civic Renewal offer a multi-
method, cross-disciplined approach to the study of the relationship between news, 
communication and polarization, and will continue to produce valuable research in this 
field that will be useful for future analysis.400 
 Future research in Wisconsin should delve deeper into the partisan divisions 
surrounding major events like the COVID-19 pandemic and the presidential election. 
Additional studies should continue to make use of the wealth of data available from the 
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Marquette Poll, but should also take a cue from Cramer’s “politics of resentment” 
research, which has relied heavily on individual conversations and personal 
experiences to present these lofty concepts in relatable, real-life context. 
 There is still much to learn about what happens to political participation, 
engagement and polarization as the news media landscape changes. The evidence 
amassed in this work makes a compelling case that a diminished traditional news media 
is undesirable in our democracy, especially as partisan outlets fill the gaps. These 
trends are likely to elevate extreme voices, reinforce negative perceptions between 
political camps, and drive political actors away from compromise. As gridlock becomes 
more frequent and more impenetrable, voters’ negative attitudes toward government 
and institutions in general are likely to deepen. The cycle of dysfunction and 
polarization, if left unchecked, will become an ouroboros. 
 Just as public lack of trust in news media existed before Donald Trump’s 
presidency, it will continue to be an issue after he leaves the White House. So, too, will 
political polarization—and, as a result of the economic fallout of the coronavirus 
pandemic, so, too, will the financial threats to traditional news media. Additionally, 
absent significant changes to the allocation of political power in the United States, state 
governments will continue to hold considerable weight in our democracy and, as a 
result, so will statehouse coverage. If journalism is to fulfill its role as a steward of 
democracy, solutions must be offered and implemented to restore resources and build 
trust—likely with some trial and error. A key factor in building trust will be ensuring that 
these solutions are designed with the aim of decreasing polarization and thus, moving 
toward a news media that is trusted regardless of partisan affiliation. 
127 
 The search for solutions is complicated in part by journalism’s complex 
relationship with government, serving both as a check on political actors and as a 
fundamental pillar of democracy. Ultimately, to preserve the profession’s “watchdog” 
role, solutions must primarily come from within the industry, and not from the 
government. However, that does not mean government does not have a role to play. 
 A number of promising proposals aimed at preserving local journalism have 
already been introduced or floated by members of Congress: 
 As suggested by Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders, the Federal Communications 
Commission should implement a moratorium on mergers of major media 
corporations until their effects on democracy can be better determined.401 Any 
assessment of these effects should include recommendations for the 
enforcement and/or development of antitrust laws. Media companies should also 
be required to disclose whether proposed mergers would result in significant 
layoffs, similar to the requirements of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining 
Notification Act.402 
 As Massachusetts Sen. Elizabeth Warren has proposed, the private equity firms 
that have purchased, gutted, and sold so many local newsrooms should face 
stricter regulations and transparency requirements. Warren’s “Stop Wall Street 
Looting Act” would require these companies to share information about 
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ownership and debt, and would implement worker protections to deter firms from 
“stripping (newspapers) down for parts.”403 
 Solutions from within the journalism industry should be guided by the principles 
of transparency and engagement, with the primary goal of earning trust. A 2019 study 
conducted by University of Texas at Austin Center for Media Engagement researchers 
found that increasing transparency on a news website can increase both its perceived 
credibility and the level of engagement among readers.404 As documented throughout 
this thesis, increased trust in news media can positively affect political participation and 
may decrease the polarizing influence of partisanship. 
 Several organizations—composed of academic researchers and practicing 
journalists—have offered some useful recommendations as newsrooms seek to build 
trust in their communities: 
 Readers surveyed by the Center for Media Engagement in 2019 said they want 
newspapers to do a better job of 1) digging deeper into stories, 2) explaining 
jargon and procedures, 3) explaining why some voices were included in stories 
and others were left out, and 4) detailing efforts to prevent bias from influencing 
reporting.405 To fulfill these requests, newsrooms should link to previous 
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coverage whenever possible; offer explanations of terminology, specialized 
processes, and sourcing decisions; and direct readers to explanations of 
newsroom policies.406 
 Newsrooms should follow the lead of news organizations like Colorado Public 
Radio, StoryCorps, The Tennessean and many others that have launched 
projects designed to facilitate civil, productive interactions among people who 
disagree. These efforts, as detailed by the Center for Media Engagement, should 
include a diverse group of participants, experiment with different methods of 
interaction, create an environment that promotes positive interactions, and lead 
to further analysis and follow-ups.407     
 Newsrooms should follow the guidelines and recommendations put forth by 
efforts like Trusting News and The Trust Project. Examples include: emphasize 
local connections to differentiate local news from “the media;” invite feedback 
and be responsive; explain efforts to provide balance; clearly label content 
(“news,” “analysis,” “opinion,” etc.); explain the reporting process; share 
information about ethics and funding; present journalists as human beings; and 
share the publication’s mission and guiding principles.408 
 As a journalist, I can attest to the power of a personal connection. On several 
occasions while interviewing supporters at Trump rallies, I listened to indictments of “the 
media” as an entity, followed up with a comment along the lines of, “You don’t seem that 
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bad, though.” As long as local journalism continues to dwindle, so, too, will the number 
of opportunities for people to interact with journalists and gain some measure of trust in 
news—as will voters’ shared sense of community. And as long as partisan news media 
continues to take the place of traditional publications, moderate political voices will be 
diminished while extreme perspectives are elevated. Continuation of these trends will 
further deepen political divisions and dissatisfaction with government, drive gridlock, 
discourage political deliberation and participation, and weaken the “watchdog” function 
of the free press. 
 Further efforts to understand how the news media can gain the trust of the public, 
how less polarized states differ from states like Wisconsin, and what can be done to 
bridge the country’s deep ideological gaps will benefit democracy at every level. Without 
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